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ABSTRACT
Zachariasen, Craig Z . , M.A., Spring 1983 Political Science
Post World War II American Civil-Military Relations: External
Threats and Public Support for the Military
Director: Forest L. Grieves
This work is an analysis of the impact external events have on 
public opinion and support of the American military. Specifically, 
the study centers on the allocation of two important national 
resources— money and manpower— and the public's willingness to 
sacrifice these in support of an efficient military organization 
which is used as an implement of foreign policy. This involves 
a study of fluctuations in defense spending and enlistee rates as 
indicators of the public's support for its military establishment.
In conclusion, public opinion and its influence on defense 
spending in reaction to an external crisis is a valid indication 
of public support for the nation's military and foreign policies, 
but fluctuation in enlistee rates is not. They are due primarily 
to changes in the domestic environment.
11
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PREFACE
American civil-military relations are established on 
the foundation of civil control over the function and use 
of military forces. Achieving a compatible relationship 
between this civilian control and military effectiveness has 
long plagued American policy makers. Quite often, the issue 
of civil-mi 1i ta ry relations is addressed strictly in terms 
of "the military" with little regard to civilian influence 
in these relations. Americans must not forget that a nation 
and its military forces are not separate entities, and that 
the military's role in society is a result of environmental 
factors. One such factor which has a definite influence on 
society's attitude towards the military is an external threat 
or foreign policy crisis.
It can generally be assumed that opposition towards the 
military will increase or decrease in relation to the inten­
sity of a perceived threat or crisis. Gabriel Almond in The 
Ameri can P eople and Foreign Poli cy states that when foreign 
policy questions pose a threat to the normal conduct of 
affairs, they share the public's attention with domestic 
concerns. He concludes by saying, "it is not the foreign 
or domestic character of the issue which determines the 
accessibility of public attention, but the intimacy of the 
im p a c t ."
1 1 1
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How can we evaluate the intimacy of this impact? It 
will be the purpose of this thesis to analyze two areas of 
public interest which seem to reflect A m e r i c a ’s concern 
relating to national defense. These areas will concentrate 
on two of the nation's resources which are of direct impor­
tance to the American public: money and manpower. A
military force cannot function without these resources, and 
the importance a nation places in its military is reflected 
in its willingness to allow these resources to be allocated 
to the armed forces. Thus, research for this thesis is 
concentrated on the defense budget and the level of public 
opposition toward military service.
This thesis is not an attempt at a definitive work on 
the subject encompassing all the elements such an effort 
would entail. Rather, the modest goal of this work is an 
effort to demonstrate a pattern between fluctuations in the 
areas of the public attitude pertaining to military service 
and the defense budget in the presence of an external threat 
or crisis. This thesis is an attempt to answer the follow­
ing question: Do fluctuations in the areas of attitude
toward military service and the defense budget provide a 
reliable assessment of the level of public support, or 
opposition, present in American society toward the military? 
It is my belief that fluctuation in these areas will support 
the hypothesis— that public support of the military does 
fluctuate in relation to the presence of a foreign policy
IV
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crisis. The time span will be limited to the years 1946-1980.
The first chapter presents a broad historical survey 
of American civil-mi 1i t a ry relations which developed the 
themes of civilian supremacy over the military, reliance on 
a citizen soldier, military influence in policy making, and 
the effect public opinion has had on national security 
policy. Chapter Two discusses the various theories and 
ideas concerning the role of public opinion in deciding 
policy issues. The theories as to the appropriate role for 
public opinion in policy development are many and varied, 
but this chapter develops the perspective that public opinion 
has three functions in policy development. It acts as a 
constraint, a stimulus, and a resource for policy makers.
These functions are carried into Chapter Three which 
correlates fluctuations in the defense budget with the 
presence of an external threat or crisis and the support of 
the American public for a decrease or increase in defense 
spending. Chapter Four attempts to clarify the same idea 
in relation to public attitude toward military service.
Chapter Five, the concluding chapter, will endeavor to 
assess the impact the presence of external events and public 
opinion have had on public support for the military based 
on the findings in Chapters Two and Three.
Hopefully, this thesis will provide additional support 
to the idea that the American military is a reflection of 
American society, and its efficiency is in direct relation
V
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to the support it receives from the American people.
^Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy 
(New York: Frederick Al P r a e g e r , I960) , p . 71.
V I
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CHAPTER I
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS 1776-1980: A REVIEW
Int roduct i on
The United States military establishment has become the 
largest institutional complex within the United States 
government. The military's operations influence all elements 
of society, ranging from education to medicine. In addition, 
its presence extends into almost every community of the 
United States in the form of military bases. National Guard 
or Reserve units, and numerous other elements of the m i l i ­
tary organization, such as ROTC and armed forces recruiters.
Americans have historically looked upon their military 
establishment with contrasting attitudes. In the early 
days of America, the citizenry saw in their geographic 
isolation from Europe a protection for themselves and their 
independence. Most Americans also believed that a standing 
army--by nature of its composition, discipline, and power —  
posed an overwhelming threat to their liberty. Experiences 
such as the Boston Massacre, the Quartering Act, and other 
incidents during colonial times made the standing army the 
universal symbol of despotism and corruption.^
In another light, Americans have looked to their 
military institutions as instruments of defense for 
their liberties and as an institution that could not 
threaten society. As John Hancock stated:
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their (the military) interest is the same as that of 
the state...; they do not jeopardize their lives for 
a master who considers them only instruments of 
his ambi t i o n s .
These differing opinions as to the place in society the 
military occupies have caused much research, discussion, and 
analysis concerning what has come to be known as the 
American civil-mi 1i t a ry tradition. It is the purpose of 
this chapter to review the evolution of American civil- 
military relations from 1776-1980 in an attempt to identify 
any apparent trends or major themes in American civil- 
military relations regarding the military.
1. American Civil-Mi 1i tary Evolution 1776-1900 
The Anglo-American tradition of civil-mi 1 i t a ry relation­
ships was born in the system of government used in England 
in the eighteenth century. A large standing army did not 
exist; and, therefore, the defense of England relied upon
a compulsory levy of the male population to serve in the
3militia when the need arose. This system also was used in 
the American colonies. However, central control over the 
state militias was absent, just as there was no central 
control over home government. Each colony developed its own 
version of government and militia. Militiamen were not to 
be used outside of their colonial boundaries and must be 
controlled by the colonial g o v e r n m e n t .^
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During the French and Indian War, American militia
units proved to be poorly trained and equipped which led to
their not presenting an equal match to the French forces.
Jealousies among the colonies prevented the acceptance of
Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan, which called for a "Grand
Council" of colonial delegates to raise, finance, and
5strengthen the defense of all the colonies.
During the course of the American Revolution, a dual 
myth developed that the militiamen were either useless or 
the only true victors of the war. In a balanced view, it 
must be clearly understood that they contributed greatly to 
the war ef fo rt, but that it was not their expertise in the 
military art which made them important— but, as historian 
Maurice Matloff states, it was the "ubiquity of the militia 
that made British victories over Continentals (Regulars) in 
the field so meaningless."^
Continental Regulars were found to be more reliable 
than the militia but available in far fewer numbers. 
Continentals were reinforced by state militias as they moved 
from one area of the war to another. General Washington, 
himself, maintained that "regular troops are alone equal to 
the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as offense, 
and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory
7and rui nou s."
Nationalism, a key to successful government as well as 
military policy, was weakened in the colonies by the fact
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Revolution was being fought against a central authority
8and by the various state loyalties of the colonists. C o n ­
gress was made up of thirteen delegates from sovereign states 
and lacked the financial power necessary to direct the 
struggle. Congress's inability to tax led them to direct 
the states to supply their own line units. This caused many 
logistical problems and increased the internal division 
within the army. Despite all these problems, it is still 
necessary to point out that the consolidated— although, 
often disjointed— effort of the colonies to defeat England 
was the prime example of a rising feeling of nationalism in 
America. Also, the debate which began long before the 
Revolution on the positive or negative aspects of a standing 
army versus a volunteer militia was not settled and would 
continue for decades to come.
During the Revolution, American leaders attempted to 
develop a governmental system capable of providing for 
coordinated conduct of the war and also to establish policies 
and procedures which would lead them safely into the future. 
The first real national government adopted by the thirteen 
states in 1777— ratified in 1781— was labeled the Articles 
of Confederation, a simple "league of friendship."^ There 
was no central directing body, and Congress lacked the power 
to levy taxes, raise troops, establish courts, or compel 
states to observe the treaties made with other countries.
The Articles were very weak and forced reliance on a cons en —
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sus by the individual states to conduct most political 
act i o n .
Militarily, the Articles of Confederation could have 
led to the complete failure of the Revolutionary War. The 
Continental Congress did not have the authority to finance 
the military and could only request militia units for service 
with the Continentals. This did not change when the C o n t i ­
nental Congress became the Congress of the United States. 
Congress was given the power to declare war but still had 
to requisition money and men from the s t a t e s . U n d e r  these 
restrictions, it would be difficult to raise a Confederation 
force of any real military effectiveness. Problems, such 
as this, in requesting military forces from the states to 
protect nat i ona1 interests were indicative of military 
affairs under the Articles.
George Washington, who as Commander of the Continental 
Army during the revolution, had suffered under this system 
and was a strong proponent of a constitution which gave the 
central government the powers of the purse and sword. His 
criticism of the Articles is best presented by an excerpt 
in a letter he wrote to a relative:
The great business of war can never be well 
conducted, if it can be conducted at all, while the 
powers of Congress are only recommendatory. While 
one state yields obedience and another refuses it, 
while a third mutilates and adopts the measure in 
part only, and all vary in time and manner, it is 
scarcely possible that our affairs can prosper, or
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that anything.but disappointment can follow the 
best concerted plans.
The inability of the government to run the nation
effectively prompted thirteen delegates from the states to
meet in Philadelphia in March 1787 to revise the Articles.
The central question of the convention was to attempt to
establish an effective distribution of authority between the
states and central government. Although the question of
national defense was not the premier one, it was recognized
as a matter of considerable importance. As discussion over
the distribution of authority proceeded, the support the
delegates gave toward either a strong or weak military was
established in accordance with their views on the larger
1 2question of a strong or weak national government.
The military clauses of the Constitution came to reflect 
a cautious compromise between the hopes of those who favored 
greater military strength and the fears of those who antici ­
pated a military despotism. The Constitution firmly 
established the element of civilian control of the military 
by the division of war powers between the legislative and 
executive branches of government. This delineation of duties 
was to insure a balance of civil and military authority. 
Command of the military was placed with the President and 
the powers of financing and raising a military placed with 
Congress. Congress was also given the sole authority to 
declare wa r .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The states were placated in that each was guaranteed 
a republican form of government and was allowed to maintain 
their own militias. They were to be responsible for ap point­
ing officers and training all militia forces in accordance
13with regulations provided by Congress.
With the acceptance of the Constitution in 1789, the 
n ew republic was provided with a system for the partitioning 
of power between the states and the nation. It also estab­
lished a set of checks and balances which was to insure no 
abuse of power by any one branch of the go v e r n m e n t . The 
Constitution retained the dual military system bequeathed 
to the United States by its his tor y— a citizen soldiery 
enrolled in state militias, plus a professional army. The 
formation of the Legion of the United States under General 
"Mad" Anthony Wayne marked the beginning of the United 
States Regular Army. The Militia Act of 1792 called for the 
enrollment of every free, white able-bodied male citizen 
between eighteen and forty-five in the militia of his state. 
This Act preserved and improved the inherited tradition of 
a citizen soldier which was to be the mainstay of America's 
defense for years to come.^^
By 1794, the Regular Army numbered some four thousand 
men, but an American Navy was nonexistent. A national policy 
of defense was also lacking because America was relying on 
its geographic isolation to be its first line of defense.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In response to the European threat caused by the out­
break of the French Revolution and the subsequent quarrel 
between Great Britain and France, Americans began to consider 
a more substantial system of defense. Coastal fortifications
were rebuilt, and six frigates were authorized for the Navy,
15although, only three were completed. The creation of a
Department of Navy and the appointment of a Secretary of 
Navy was prompted by America's undeclared war with France 
in 1798. This war produced the beginnings of a formal 
American Navy in developing teamwork and fighting spirit.
In 1801, the Jeffersonians entered office intent upon 
economy in government, including the reduction of military 
expenditures. Jefferson saw the future of the Navy in his 
gunboat fleet and the future of the Army in the citizen's 
militia. During his tenure in office, the Army was reduced 
from four thousand to twenty-six hundred m e n .^^
Jefferson's military defensive system— or lack of it —  
set the stage for the problems the Madison administration 
would face in attempting to achieve political goals without 
the military means to support them. At the beginning of the 
War of 1812, President Madison dwelt on Great Britain's need 
to respect American neutrality at sea. This was a ludicrous 
request, for America did not have the naval might to enforce 
I t . 17
Due to the lack of naval support, American action in 
response to England's hostility was to punish her at "some
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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vulnerable point until she should feel obliged to yield to
18the American view of international law at sea." This
vulnerable point came to be Canada. The defeat of America's 
Canadian expedition caused public support for the war to 
dimini s h .
The War of 1812 was at best a military draw and a
political embarrassment for Americans. Still, it contributed
to the building of national unity. Men of different states
fighting side by side to protect the nation and the few
military successes they achieved served to give the nation
a more mature and independent attitude, which served to
19unite and strengthen its character.
There were those, however, who looked at the results 
of the war from a different perspective. The deficiencies 
of the Army--made up of state mi 1 i t ias--in relation to the 
discipline and bravery of the Regular A rm y — whose composition 
was of professional soldiers— and the poor showing of the 
state militia volunteers pointed towards a need for military 
reform. President Madison was one who saw this need, but 
the weight of public sentiment made the acceptance of m i l i ­
tary reform proposals unlikely. John C. Calhoun, Secretary 
of War under President Monroe, recommended an "expansible 
a r m y ” to Congress. The staff and cadres of such an estab­
lishment would be maintained during peacetime. If hos ti li­
ties should break out, the nucleus of this army— six thousand
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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officers and me n— -could be tripled by a simple expansion
process using volunteers as fill-ins. Calhoun stated his
reason for maintaining this type of Army as follows:
I am aware that the militia is considered, 
and in many respects justly, as the great national 
force; but, to render them effective they require 
the aid of regular troops. War is an art, to 
attain perfection in which, much time and exper^Q 
ence, particularly for officers, are necessary.
Calhoun's plan was not accepted by Congress, but the as sum p­
tion he made gained almost universal acceptance. The regular 
army would be small but expandable and professional. The 
militia would, as before, constitute the main mass. The 
need for a strong navy surfaced because of the British 
freedom to roam the seas at will during the War of 1812.
As a result, America's first line of defense consisted of 
battleships and frigates backed up by coastal batteries.
Thus, a longtime military policy of reliance on a strong 
standing Navy and an expandable Army began, which was to 
continue into the twentieth century.
The result of these formative years— 1783-1815— was that 
the young nation proved itself capable of survival and able 
to organize and plan for internal development. The creation 
of the Constitution set the stage for the republic's future.
A tenuous compromise between state sovereignty and the powers 
of a nationalist government also evolved. This compromise 
did not settle the debate but quieted it for the time being. 
The realization that a nation must have an Army and Navy to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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defend its shores and to project its presence abroad dawned 
on Americans. A large standing army still was not accepted, 
but the need for a small Army of professionals was acknow- 
1 e d g ed .
After the War of 1812, America entered a period of 
national growth. Railroads began etching their way west, 
and America's merchant navy began to spread American trade 
and presence a round the world. This period of nation 
building became marked by the widespread Involvement of the 
military, primarily the Army, In many facets of American 
life. An Indication of the declining Interest In military 
affairs Is the content of John Quincy Adam's second annual 
message. In this message, the peacetime duties of the Army 
have more significance placed on them than just their readi­
ness for war. In his message, Ada m states:
...to the War Department are attributed other 
duties...the maintenance of our relations of 
peace and of protection with the Indian tribes, 
and the Internal Improvements and surveys for the 
location of roads and canals, which during the 
last 3 sessions of Congress have engaged so much 
of their attention, and may engross so large a « ̂ 
share of the future benefaction to our country.
The reorganization of West Point In 1817 marked It as 
America's first school of technology. Up until 1840 and 
even 1850, almost all the nation's civil engineers received 
their preparation at West Point. They assisted In develop­
ing the nation's harbors and waterways and In surveying for 
the railroads. In 1834, the House Committee on Military
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Affairs remarked:
The A c a d e m y ... has accomplished a noble service 
by sending forth numbers annually competent to 
superintend the construction of those chains of 
Internal improvement which ^ ^ ^ b e  the external 
bonds of our National Union...
The years between 1817-1845 were known as the "Thirty
Years Peace." As far as the Regular Army was concerned, this
was a misnomer. With the advent of the westward movement
of settlers and railroads, the Army was kept busy providing
protection for these American pioneers. Three major Indian
conflicts— the Seminole War of 1817, the Blackhawk War of
1832, and the Florida or Second Seminole W a r — were but a
beginning of the major conflicts America would have with the
23Indians over the next eighty years.
The Army entered into the Mexican War highly confident 
in itself and its capabilities. Professionalism within the 
officer's corps had increased, and education in technical 
and tactical advancements enabled the small Regular Army to 
be familiar with the latest thoughts and equipment in these 
areas. A public, spurred on by the theory of "Manifest 
Destiny," lent moral support to many of the military opera­
tions in the West and Southwest.
One of the principal military features of the Mexican 
War was the demonstrated ability of the citizen soldier, 
with a basic military training, to fight respectably alon g­
side Regulars. This was brought about by professionally
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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trained officers who were available to supervise volunteer 
training. The results of this training were summarized by 
then-Lieutenant Ulysses Grant:
The citizen soldiers were associated with so 
many disciplined men and professionally educated 
officers, that when they went into engagements it 
was with a confidence they would not have felt 
otherwi sg. They became soldiers themselves almost 
at once.
Primarily, because the Army did well in the Mexican
War and partly because the government was aware of the
results changes in military policy might have in affecting
the sectional balance of the nation, few innovations marked
the history of the United States military from the Mexican
War to 1861. As the sectional crisis continued, both sides
exempted the Regular Army from involvement in it to prevent
either side from obtaining a potential military advantage
25over the other. In addition, the normal demobilization
of forces at the conclusion of hostilities, which had become 
a trademark of the Anglo-American military tradition, had 
occurred unnoticed. This spread the remaining Regular 
forces very thin over the vast frontier it now  had to police 
As a major issue of domestic policy, the question of a 
military force organization and use would not be addressed 
as a major issue again until the Civil War. America's 
attention was now fixed on the questions of sectionalism, 
states rights, and slavery. All issues, the result of which 
would lead to a division of the nation itself.
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The United States entered the Civil War with the same 
military system that had been bequeathed it by the makers 
of the Constitution. The organized militia of the states 
had fallen into disrepair, but many volunteer organizations 
had emerged to take their place. The United States Army as 
a regular professional force influenced the war little. 
Twenty-six thousand regulars on active duty at one time
26during the Civil War was the maximum. The majority of the
regulars were being used to take care of the Indians on the
frontiers, and only minimal numbers were to be used to train
the volunteers, despite the lessons learned in the Mexican
American War. Both governments turned most of the recruiting
burden over to the state and initially had considerable
success in meeting the desired numbers. As historian Bruce
Cat t on states, "in 1861, war had come because emotion took
27charge when hard decisions were to be m a d e . ” The surge 
of emotional zeal did not last, however, and both governments 
soon turned to conscription. Combined, they mobilized 
approximately two and a quarter million men during the 
course of the war.
Civil-military problems during this period of turmoil 
were not as evident as they were during p e a c e . Americans 
have a tendency to fall in line with national policy once 
a war commences. So it was in the Civil War. One of the 
major problems Abraham Lincoln faced as President was who 
should be placed in charge of the military forces.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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initially, it was to be aging General Winfield Scott.
General Scott was soon replaced by General William McClellan
Lincoln's war aims passed through two stages--conci1iation
with the South a n d , later in the war, total defeat of the 
9 ASouth. In order to coordinate military strategy with
national policy, Lincoln attempted to utilize generals whose
military strategy ran parallel with national policy.
General McClellan's conciliatory strategy corresponded with
Lincoln's initial attempt to reunify the Union quickly and
with limited loss of life. His principal objective was not
the destruction of the Confederate Army but the capture of
29Richmond in hopes that this could shorten the war. 
M c C l e l l a n ’s caution, however, eventually caused him to be 
relieved by Lincoln during the Penninsula Campaign.
McClellan was followed by a string of generals who were 
neither effective in coordinating military strategy with 
political policy nor in the actual conduct of war.
During this middle stage of the war, the problems which 
surfaced were not caused solely by military inefficiency. 
Lincoln, himself, failed to supply his generals with m i l i ­
tary objectives and policy guidance to permit the two to
30complement each other. It is imperative that in a
democracy the military be given direction by the civilian 
authorities. Without this direction, military success is 
unlikely, and the danger of military authority creating its 
own strategy and policy is increased. Russell Weigley best
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explained Lincoln's dilemma in Hist ori cal Pimen si on s of 
Nat i ona1 Se curi ty P rob lem s:
He (Lincoln) hoped to find a way to avoid 
that outcome in the Civil War, but he failed. The 
war became a social revolution. Once Lincoln 
acquiesced in that result, and concluded finally 
that only the utter destruction of the Confederate 
armies, war resources, and will to fight to restore 
the Union, he chose and supported, in Grant and 
Sherman, generals whose strategy fitted the new 
and now ruthless design of the war.
With the acceptance by Lincoln of Grant as general of 
the armies, the end of the war was set. The surrender of 
Lee at Appomattox and the end of an era marked by the 
reunification of the nation were the results of the coordi­
nated political policy and military strategy applied by 
Lincoln and Grant. In the history of mi 1itary — civi1ian 
relationships, this was to be a prime example of the "yoking 
of military strategy and civilian policy" as stated by 
historian Russell Weigley.
With the surrender of Confederate forces, the United 
States Regular Army was given two primary responsibilities. 
The mass armies of the war were replaced by volunteer p r o ­
fessionals, many of whom were immigrants escaping famine and 
oppression in Europe. These volunteers were to police the 
frontiers of the nation and to carry out the policy of 
reconstruction in the defeated Southern states. It was this 
latter policy of reconstruction which caused serious civil- 
military problems. President Johnson's reconstruction 
policies in the South were deemed too liberal by the
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soldiers. Also, the presidential backing of the military
to carry out such a sensitive policy was lacking, and Union
officers became convinced that Johnson's policy strengthened
former rebels and according to Harold Hyman allowed
"unrepentant southern whites to harass federal soldiers and
3 3Unionists..." Soon a division of allegiances among the
officers formed— those who were siding with Congress and 
those who were with the President. Johnson's resultant 
impeachment was due, in large part, to his seeking to be 
commander-in-chi ef of the army units in the South, which 
was to be under the control of Congress. He escaped convic­
tion by one vote, but reconstruction proceeded in the manner 
the soldiers had felt necessary since 1865. From this time
on, the Army was to be invisible in the realm of government 
34no longer.
During the period 1865-1899, the Army fought ten
separate campaigns against the Indians to maintain peace on
the frontier and to expand westward. Although the Indian
wars and the French threat in Mexico kept the Army lean and
hard and bequeathed it a rich tradition of professionalism,
these years— 1865-1891— were to be known as the "Dark Ages
35of the Army." During this period, the military was used
to quell civil disturbances, which never endears an Army to 
the society of which it is a part. In 1877, the Hayes 
administration used troops to restore order following several
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
18
railroad worker strikes. The Army was also used in the 
Pullman Strike of 1894 under President C l e v e l a n d ’s direction; 
and on 8 July 1894, army troops fired upon a mob in Hammond, 
Indiana, and at least one rioter was killed.
During these "Dark Ages," American society isolated the 
armed forces politically, intellectually, socially, and even 
physically. The majority of the forces were stationed on 
the frontiers and had limited contact with the rest of the 
nation until 1890. An educational system beyond West Point 
was established, and under the guidance of General Sherman 
a more equitable method of promotion and retirement policies 
was established. Experiments in a more effective command 
structure were tried but would not take hold until after the 
Spanish American War. Congressional budget cuts also 
condemned both the Army and Navy to obsolescence in equipment 
and tactics. The desire for economy made it almost a crime 
for a naval officer to utilize the engines on his ship, and 
the Navy returned to using canvas rather than steam propul ­
sion.^^
Few periods in American history have witnessed a greater 
or more significant change in direction in national policy 
than that which occurred a round the turn of the century. 
Alfred Thayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea P ower Upon Hist ory 
and his thesis that national greatness was directly related 
to an ability to control the sea influenced many in America.
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Mahan's thesis and the colonial conflicts over Samoa and the 
Hawaiian Islands between America and European nations 
starting in 1883 caused the United States Navy to modernize 
and become one of the most powerful in the world. This 
overseas involvement increased the imperialist sentiment in 
the United States during the last decade of the nineteenth
3 8century, which some claim caused the Spanish American War. 
When the Spanish American War broke out, the actual
strength of the Army was slightly over twenty-eight
3 9thousand. In April 18 9 8 , Congress voted to double the
strength of the military; and, due to the emotional surge 
which seems to accompany American involvement in hostilities, 
it had no problem getting enough volunteers. Whether the 
National Guard, the new name given to all state militias, 
could be used abroad legally was at first doubtful. This 
was made legal with the passing of the Volunteer Bill, which 
resulted in the state National Guard units being used 
extensively in the Ca r i b b e a n .
The weakness of the War Department in coordinating the 
activities of the war prompted Secretary of War Elihu Root 's 
reform and reorganization of that Department in 1901. 
Performance of the Regulars versus the volunteers again 
caused debate among civilian and military leaders. The 
volunteer units had arrived poorly equipped and trained as 
a whole and were of limited effectiveness in the initial
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phases of the war. In 1903, the passage of the Dick Act was 
meant to establish federal control over the National Guard 
and to provide some standardization in training and equip­
ment.^^ Also, the establishment of the General Staff took 
place to provide for better organization and planning.
Major themes of American civil-mi 1i tary relations during 
the years 1776-1899 can be linked to all areas of national 
development beginning with the birth of the nation which was 
supported and won by military forces. Four major themes, 
however, need to be kept in mind. They are civilian 
supremacy over the military, reliance on a military based 
on the citizen soldier concept, the influence the military 
wields in policy making, and last, the impact public opinion 
has on national security policy.
The first theme— civilian supremacy over the military—  
was a result of the traditions inherited by the American 
colonists from their British ancestors, known today as the 
Anglo-American military tradition. Civilian supremacy was 
embodied in the Constitution of the United States and was 
a precaution constantly practiced by the governing authori­
ties. Congress was given power of the purse and the ability 
to declare war while the President was designated as the 
Commander-in-Chi e f . As the President, he was subject to the 
will of the people; and by command association, the military 
was also subject to the will of the people.
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The public's will or desire has resulted in the second 
theme. That is, a military establishment based upon the 
citizen soldier. The debate concerning the composition of 
America's military force has been continuous throughout 
America's history. Should emphasis be placed on a military 
composed of citizen soldiers with limited military skills—  
at some cost to military efficiency? Or is emphasis to be 
placed on a strong professional military— despite internal 
dangers of uncontrollable military influence? A compromise 
was effected in the dual pattern of defense championed by 
Calhoun and institutionalized into the concept of the citizen 
solider as the primary means of defense, but at the same time 
a small Regular Army was established as the cornerstone of 
national defense.
This second theme led to concern over a third: the
military influence in the national security process. Only 
in a few exceptional cases did the military establishment 
significantly influence national policy. Most of these 
cases were in relation to wartime circumstances. The estab­
lishment of occupation policies in Mexico in 1846 by General 
Winfield Scott provides one example. Also, during the Civil 
War, the compatibility of Grant's military strategy and 
Lincoln's national policy gave the military considerable 
influence in national security policy formation. The 
programs during Reconstruction were instituted by military
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commanders in the Southern states. Last, occupation of the 
Philippines after the Spanish American War gave the military 
considerable influence over national security policy in that 
area. Prior to World War II, the generally accepted guidance 
was that military should "play a role in the formulation of 
national security policy only when the duress of war made 
the armed forces responsible for executing such policy" as
stated by Amos Jordan in A m e r i can Nat i ona1 Securi t y : Pollcy
. _ 42and P r o c e ss .
Military influence has an interrelationship with the 
fourth theme of public opinion and its impact on national 
security policy. Public opinion has always been to some 
degree a constraint on the formulators of policy. De 
Tocquevilie describes the effect public opinion has in a 
democratic government in relation to foreign policy:
Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those 
qualities which a democracy possesses ; . . .a democracy 
is unable to regulate the details of an important 
undertaking, to persevere in a design, and to work 
out its execution in the presence of serious 
obstacles-. It cannot combine measures with secrecy 
and it will not await their consequences with 
pat i enc e. . .demoeraci e s .. .obey the impulse of 
passion rather than suggestion of prudence and... 
abandon a mature design for the gratification of 
a monetary caprice.
This relationship was not as evident during the n i n e ­
teenth century as it has been during the twentieth century, 
but some cases are visible. The impact of public opinion 
was evident in the reaction of society at the beginning of
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the Civil War and the Spanish American War with the initial 
flood of volunteers to military service. Like others, 
Americans are emotional people and tend to think with their 
hearts and pride before their mind on many occasions. Public 
opinion plays a significantly larger part in the security 
policy process as the coverage of events through different 
media sources increases. These media sources continue to 
develop and make society more aware of what is happening in 
their world— thus, assisting them in forming an opinion.
The twentieth century will show the real impact of public 
opinion on national security policy formulation.
America entered the twentieth century as a leading 
industrial and world power with a wealth and military 
potential which would draw her into international political 
activity whether she liked it or not. Envisioning vast 
well-trained conscript armies and mighty fleets, professional 
military men offered military policies attractive to govern ­
ment authorities planning America's role in the international 
world of the twentieth century. The services streamlined 
their operations and developed closer and closer relations 
with American business and industry. The military, as has 
the nation, came a long way from the early days of the n i n e ­
teenth century. It cannot go back even if it wanted to, and 
there seems to be no evidence that it desires to do so.
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2. American C i v i 1-Mi 1 i tary Relations 1900-1980
The term "Progressive Era" was applied to the first 
years of the twentieth century in the United States. E c o ­
nomic and social problems had emerged from rapid growth of 
large-scale industry in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. Political leaders, such as Theodore Roosevelt, 
attempted to solve these problems during the years prior to 
World War I. Writings of the "Muckrackers" and other social 
reformers enhanced public awareness of these difficulties, 
and popular support for legislative action to solve them was 
forthcoming. In the area of foreign policy, this period 
was a time of conflicting objectives for the nation. On the 
one side, America was predominantly rural, agricultural, and 
isolationist. Conversely, the decade of the 1890s had left 
America involved overseas and presented with problems that 
had heretofore been absent in America. In the end, the 
nation's new responsibilities and expanding commercial 
interests abroad made the attempt to "go back to the good 
old days" impossible. During this period, America became 
one of the most powerful and influential nations in the 
w o r 1d .
The new mood at home and abroad also had an effect on 
the nation's military establishment-. During the years 
between the Spanish American War and United States involve­
ment in World War I, the Army and Navy underwent important
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organizational reforms. As mentioned previously, the forma­
tion of the General Staff and the Dick Act of 1903 were 
oriented toward improving military organization, training, 
and coordination in both the Regular Army and the Reserves. 
The Navy's successful performance in the War with Spain 
prompted Congress and the American people to support its 
expansion and modernization. Expansion by America in the 
Pacific and the building of the Panama Canal were results 
of the national desire to create a navy second only to Great 
Britain. In the end, this expansion committed America to 
defending territory thousands of miles from the home base.^^ 
Two areas of much closer proximity to America which 
were to cause problems were the Caribbean and Mexico. The 
problems in Cuba had not been settled with the end of the 
war with Spain. The United States continued to intervene 
in Cuba to stabilize it until 1934 in reaction to America's 
Good Neighbor Policy. Mexico's political instability led 
to a period of changing revolutionary governments. A threat 
to peace was seen in 1911 in the continuing occurrence of 
border incidents between northern Mexico and southwestern 
United States. America's occupation of Veracruz and the 
pursuit of Pancho Villa by General Pershing's forces were 
attempts by President Wilson to help stabilize the government 
of Mexico. Pershing failed to capture Villa, but the 
practical training received by Regular Army and National
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Guard troops on the frontier was Invaluable. Problems with 
mobilization of reserves and other defects in the military 
establishment caused attention to be focused on the still 
present problem of a system for maintaining in peacetime the 
quantity of forces necessary to supplement the Regular Army 
in national emergencies.^^ This system was to prove to be 
valuable to America as it prepared to become involved in the 
war in E ur ope .
After the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 
and the resultant war in which all of Europe participated, 
Americans recognized Europe as the most dangerous threat to 
their peace. President Wilson proclaimed American ne utral­
ity, yet Americans could not ignore the situation in Europe. 
Americans, by historical relationships, sided with Great 
Britain and the Allied Powers. American industry geared up 
to support Anglo-French war needs and American banks estab­
lished credit and loans for the Allied nations. The sinking 
of the Lu sit ani a in 1915 and the resulting public indignation 
towards this event prompted President Wilson to see the only 
way to keep America out of the war was to end it. He worked 
diligently to do so, but with the reopening of unrestricted 
submarine warfare by Germany in 1917, all hopes of peace 
ended. The addition of the Zimmerman Telegram and the 
resultant discovering of a plot to involve the United States 
in a war with Mexico and Japan caused Wilson on 2 April
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
1917 to ask Congress for a Declaration of War.
Nationalization of railroads and industry along with 
conscription involved all areas of American society in the 
war effort. Severe problems in American civi1-mi 1 itary 
relations were not apparent during World War I. Prior to 
the w a r , American military thought had concentrated on m a n ­
power problems. These were solved by the Selective Service 
Act of 1917, which provided 67 percent of the United States
/ narmed forces. World War 1 uncovered, however, the
neglected area of economic mobilization in an age of "total 
war" in the twentieth century. Management of the economic 
aspect of the war soon became a coordinated effort between
/ Qbusiness leaders and the military.
Technology in war during the twentieth century caused 
the creation of organizations and institutions to deal with 
ne w requirements for weapons systems or systems support. 
During World War I, the National Research Council was 
created. This agency became a central directing agency for 
scientific research during the war; and after the war, it 
reverted toward emphasis on basic science. This same 
organization was deprived of funds after the war but 
persevered and became known as the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development for World War II. The collaboration 
between science and the military was not new, but World War 
I marked a definite increase in the importance of one to the 
other .
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World War 1 was also America's first real experience 
with coalition warfare. General John J. Pershing was named 
Commander of the American Expeditionary Force (A E F ) and was 
given the responsibility of insuring that America's pa rti ci­
pation in the war was organized and not abused by the Allies. 
Wilson's aversion to w a r , the great distance between Washing­
ton, D.C. and Paris, and Pershing's personality assured his 
status more of a proconsul than a purely military représenta-
t i v e / 9
Pershing and the American Army performed respectably 
during World War I. Again, the American belief of relying 
on the call up of citizen soldiers to support the Regular 
Army was revalidated; and as hostilities ceased, Americans 
called for the return of their soldiers and the reestab­
lishing of the nation's normal peacetime affairs. Between 
11 November 1918 and 30 June 1919, approximately 2,800,000 
officers and men received discharges, and the disintegration 
of the wartime army b e g a n . T h e  draft ended after World 
War I and small appropriations to the National Guard hindered 
them in maintaining a pool of trained soldiers. The Reserve 
Officers Training Corp at the nation's land grant colleges, 
however, did continue to produce a pool of reserve officers. 
All of this demobilization was a result of America's dream 
after World War 1 —  that wars had ended forever.
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The National Defense Act of 1920 bolstered R o o t 's 
earlier reform in the area of planning and command. It gave 
the General Staff an adequate complement of officers, which 
was to be of great importance during the first days of World 
War 11. It also provided the assignment of responsibility 
for industrial mobilization to an Assistant Secretary of 
War. Further coordinations between the Army and Navy led 
to the Army and Navy Joint Board which was to develop 
contingency plans for both services. By 1934, renewed 
interest in the military and the sounds of war emanating 
from Europe and Asia prompted a rebuilding program for the 
armed forces under the Roosevelt administration. As the year 
1939 emerged, the military forces were better prepared for 
war than any other time during peace.
From 1921 to 1936, the American people and their 
elected representatives thought that America could and should 
avoid future wars with other major powers. By promoting 
international peace, avoiding commitments with old world 
nations, and maintaining only a small defense establishment, 
they believed they might achieve this goal. As history has 
shown, this was not to be.
Again for the second time in the twentieth century, 
war came to Europe. Action by Japan, Germany, and Italy 
foreshadowed what the years of 1939-1945 were to bring. No 
real changes in military policy occurred, but appropriation
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for the services from Congress became more substantial. the 
overwhelming sentiment In America, however, remained 
Isolationist, relying upon the oceans and America's friendly 
neighbors to protect It from aggression.
Events In Europe and the Far East helped to stimulate 
a rearmament program In the United States, which helped bring 
the nation out of the depression and created one of the most 
powerful armed forces In history. Between the appeasement 
of Hitler at Munich In 1938 and the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor In 1941, America awakened to the dangers from without 
and began to mobilize. In 1940, the Selective Service Act 
was passed and aid to Britain began. Strategic planners In 
Washington began a coordinated effort In developing plans 
concerning global and coalition warfare. Again, the m i l i ­
tary and business establishments of the nation combined and 
coordinated their efforts toward the common goal of preparing 
for the wa r t o c o m e .
In 1940, the leaders of the nation authorized the draft 
of a mass army with the passing of the Selective Service Act 
by one vote. A workable system of conscription had been 
developed during World War I, and basically, the same system 
was now reactivated. World War I had also proven to the 
nation that a citizen army could be recruited swiftly and 
sent Into battle. World War 11 reconfirmed this assumption, 
for It called for the very dimensions of military power that
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America was best prepared for— a mass army composed of
citizen soldiers, skilled Regular Army officers, and massive
quantities of equipment produced by the nation's superior
51production capability.
World War 11 was also the type of war which appealed 
to the emotions of Americans. After Pearl Harbor, America 
approached the war as a crusade. Russell Weigley maintains 
that :
In the way in which Americans regarded it, 
it was a kind of Indian raid writ large: the
enemy fell treacherously upon the communities 
outer defenses, whereupon the community set aside 
everything else for the durât ion ... The aggressor, 
repulsed and beaten, the community could return 
to the ways of peace.
The support of the American public was given to the President 
and the armed forces as World War II developed into as p o p u ­
lar a war as any war can be.
Common strategy of the Allies evolved to the point where 
political objectives were put aside and emphasis placed on 
military objectives. This strategy would lessen the diffi­
culties found in conducting coalition warfare and best suited
53the emotional climate of America. Within the American
civi1-mi 1itary organization, there were few conflicts. 
President Roosevelt tended to give the military chiefs 
freedom in developing the majority of strategic plans. One 
exception to this was the decision to execute TORCH, the 
Allied invasion of North Africa. Here, President Roosevelt
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overruled the judgment of his Chiefs of Staff and Secretary
of War and directed them to use American forces in North
Africa. Eagerness to have American ground forces engaged in
large scale offensive movements was the justification for
Roosevelt's decision.
It was during World War II that the military chiefs
became very influential in determining both military and
political policy. Ada m Yarmolinsky maintains in The Mi 1i t a ry
Est abli shment that the chiefs attained almost "super cabinet 
SSstatus." From the beginning of the war to the end, 
military men were involved in foreign and, to a large extent, 
domestic policy relating to the war effort. This was to set 
the precedent for the continuation of the office of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, in one form or another, through the 
present organization of the United States national security 
st ructu r e .
With the defeat of Japan and Germany in 1945, the
traditional demobilization of America's forces began. While
demobilization continued, civil and military officials worked
toward developing a national security system capable of
coping with the postwar world. A need for a central command
authority emerged during the war, and as a result, the
56National Security Act of 1947 was passed. A National 
Military Establishment headed by a civilian Secretary of 
Defense was developed. The three services were given execu-
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tive department status and allowed direct access to the
President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff became a statutory
body and functioned as the President's principal military
advisor. The creation of a National Security Council to
coordinate diplomatic, military, and industrial plans and
to recommend security policies to the President simplified
the efficiency of the National Military Establishment. The
weakness of the plan revolved around the fact that the
Secretary of Defense was allowed only general supervision
over the service departments and that each service department
was allowed direct access to the President, thus, circum-
57venting the normal chain of command.
In response to the weaknesses, an amendment passed by 
Congress in 1949 created an executive department out of the 
National Military Establishment and labeled it the Depart­
ment of Defense. The Secretary of Defense was also given 
the prerequisite authority to coordinate the affairs of all 
three services. The National Security Act of 1947 and the 
amendment in 1949 served to formalize and tighten civilian 
control over the military and came to serve as the framework 
for national security planning for years to come.
At the end of World War II, the Truman administration 
faced a continuous decline in revenue and a decline in public 
awareness of happening s a round the world. As a result the 
administration "determined not to spend more than [it took
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C Qin] in taxes.’ In reaction to this policy, military
planners again had to revert to mobilization planning rather
than the maintenance of ready forces. The nation did not
even have enough ready forces to support its policy of
59"containment of Communist expansion."
A strategic study by the National Security Council in
April 1950, which was to be labeled NSC-68, forewarned of
the growth of Soviet power. NSC-68 advocated a substantial
increase in defense spending and an immediate build-up in
military strength in hopes of deterring Soviet aggression
without direct confrontation. This build-up, with the
increased tension in Europe, the Mediterranean and Asia
caused President Truman to request expenditures of funds to
"...provide for an early, but orderly buildup of our military
forces to a state of readiness designed to deter further
6 0acts of aggression..." Until the Korean conflict, most 
of America's defense effort was concentrated in Europe. With 
the attack of North Korean forces on South Korea and later 
the People's Republic of China, Asia gained new dominance in 
security planning. The Korean conflict also caused a 
mobilization of reserved forces in reaction to a threat— to 
be replaced by a strong ready force to act as a deterrent.
The concept of the citizen soldier was still in evidence with 
the draft. National Guard and Reserve forces, but it was no 
longer the foundation for the nation's defense. American
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participation in wars prior to Korea had allowed a gradual 
build-up of forces. The postwar world with its jet aircraft, 
rockets, and other modern weapons etc., had changed all that. 
The n e w  technology of war has required that Americans rely 
upon forces in being as a deterrent to aggression and a 
response to the limited wars of the future.
Military involvement in all areas of American society 
and government increased drastically since the forties.
More than half of the federal budget between 1951 and 1972 
went to defense expenditures.^^ Industry came to rely 
heavily upon defense contracts, and many institutions of 
education came to rely on federal grants and research 
projects to provide income. Over seventy percent of the 
scientific research conducted in the United States is 
directly or indirectly funded by the P e n t a g o n . U n t i l  1972, 
the draft and the subsequent military service impacted on 
almost all American males. Today, the draft is gone, but 
the experience of many during their service tour has affected 
American society. The furor over the treatment of Vietnam 
era vets is but one instance of the impact the military has
had through the draft.
Even though the generals and admirals have gained 
influential positions in the policy making process, it is 
still the civilian administration which makes the final 
decisions. With the advent of n e w  weapons capable of quick
and massive destruction and the ever present threat of the
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Soviet Union, the staged build-up of an expansible military 
will not be effective. America has allowed, therefore, the 
military establishment to grow and become an effective and 
powerful instrument of foreign policy.
In the world today, neither the military planner who 
looks exclusively at the military element of policy, nor the 
diplomat who views diplomacy in isolation, is a positive 
asset to his nation's government. Henry Kissinger perhaps 
stated the problem best:
A separation of policy can be achieved only 
to the detriment of both. It causes military 
power to be identified with the most absolute 
application of power and it tempts diplomacy into 
an over-concern with finesse. Since the difficult 
problems of national policy are in the area where
political, economic, psychological and military
factors overlap, we should give up the fiction
that thgre is such a thing as purely military 
a dv ice.
Civil—mi 1i t a ry relations during the sixties and seven­
ties reflected this coordination of policy and strategy.
An example was Kennedy's policy of flexible response coin­
ciding with the military's effort to rebuild their conven­
tional forces in order to insure the capacity to respond to 
a Communist military challenge anywhere in the world. An 
exception to the coordination of policy and strategy was in
Vietnam. Limited military involvement soon expanded to open
military involvement and the attempt to solve political 
problems with military force. Vietnam has proven to be a 
period in which civi1-mi 1itary relations became uncoordinated
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and resulted in the discrediting of the military and its role 
in American policy. Since the end of the Vietnam conflict, 
military influence and respectability has begun to assume 
more importance in the eyes of Americans due to the emergence
of a renewed Soviet threat. It is the power of the public
attitude towards its nation's policies which either adversely 
or positively affect the role of the military in American 
society. One hundred and forty seven years ago Alexis de 
Toqueville said the following in relation to public opinion 
in America and its effect on the military:
The general spirit of the nation's being
infused into the spirit peculiar to the Army,
tempers the opinions and desires engendered by 
military life, or represses them by the mighty 
forces of public opinion.
Would the START talks have been initiated if American 
opinion had not placed emphasis on the desire for a nuclear 
freeze? Would American participation in El Salvador be as 
limited as it is today without public refusal to support 
such a policy? The power of the public is not to be dis­
credited, especially when discussing civil-mi 1i t a ry 
relations. The impact public opinion has on policy decision 
is something every politician considers before voting on an 
issue. The military also is a reflection of society's 
attitudes, and it is this aspect that must never be forgotten.
Dominant themes during the twentieth century are rela­
tively the same as those during the nineteenth century.
Those themes were civilian supremacy over the military.
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reliance on a ci t i zen-soldi er based defense system, military 
influence in policy making, and the effect public opinion 
has had on national security policy. Differences occur in 
the evolution of each from 1776 to the 1980s. The first 
theme of civilian dominance of the military has not changed. 
Today, because of the advanced technology of weapons and 
destructiveness with which these weapons can be deployed, 
it is readily apparent that strict civilian control of the 
military is essential. Military views on policy, however, 
have become an inherent part of overall defense planning.
The National Security Council was established to implement 
the coordination necessary between America's national policy 
and military objectives.
The traditional reliance on the Anglo-American tradition 
has also been altered by increased technology in warfare.
No longer is there time for the gradual buildup of American 
forces in response to a possible threat. Wars and conflicts 
of the last three decades have emerged so rapidly as to be 
called "flare ups." America has come to rely, therefore, 
on a larger military consisting of ready forces. The tradi­
tion of the citizen soldier has not completely diminished.
The "One Army" concept professed by the military today puts 
great emphasis on the manning, equipping, and training of 
the nation's reserve forces who are the key to military 
effectiveness in case of a protracted war.
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Military influence since World War II has increased
significantly. The defense budget has fluctuated from 5
percent of the nation's GNP in 1950 to 13.5 percent in 1954
65to approximately 5 to 7 percent in 1980. It has been this
area of the economy in which the impact of military influence 
is most often observed. The primary cause for this increase 
continues to be the increased size of the military accom­
panied by the greater sophistication, which equals greater 
cost, of weapons systems. In the area of foreign policy 
formulation, the military has taken an expanded role due to 
the integration of national and military policy. The future 
of America will lie with the ability of the nation's 
politicians and diplomats to coordinate policy development 
with military strategies. Without this coordination, the 
mistakes of the past are bound to be repeated —  or reflect ed-- 
in the policies of t omo r r o w .
Last, and perhaps most important, is the impact American 
public opinion has had on the nation's foreign policy.
During the nineteenth century, public opinion's impact was 
limited by the awareness of the populace to what was going 
on in the world. The development of media technology, 
increased literacy of the American citizen, extended fran­
chise, and the impact foreign events have had on American 
society have increased awareness and opinion formation 
concerning matters of foreign policy. Issues, such as the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, had a positively electrifying and
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unifying effect on American public opinion and its subsequent 
support of the war effort. Post World War II domestic 
consensus on foreign policy remained until the United States' 
involvement in Vietnam increased. America's involvement in 
Vietnam had the opposite result of Pearl Harbor; it divided 
the American public and caused a lack of support for national 
objectives in the conflict-. As Vietnam retreats in the 
public m e m o r y , confidence is returning to American citizens 
and a greater willingness to have the United States take an 
active role as a world power is surfacing.
This theme of public opinion and its impact on national 
security and foreign policy formation, specifically the 
support of the nation's military, is worth additional study. 
This thesis will attempt to research the hypothesis that 
American opinion toward the support of military forces is 
dependent upon the intensity which external events and issues 
have on American lives and values. Areas of particular 
research in this thesis will be oriented on the public's 
support for budget allocations relating to defense and 
society's attitude toward military service.
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CHAPTER 11
PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT
Politicians court it; statesmen appeal to it; 
philosophers extol or condemn it; merchants cater 
to it; military leaders fear it; sociologists 
analyze it; statisticians measure it; and consti­
tution -mak e r s try to make it sovereign.
-Harold L. Childs
In the above quote, political scientist Childs describes 
some of the confusion surrounding public opinion. In the 
formulation of foreign policy, this confusion does not 
decrease but tends to increase. Public support for foreign 
policy initiatives is a source of strength in a democracy; 
but as political scientist Geofrey Chandler states, it is 
also looked upon as:
...a continual drag on the development of 
foreign policy which should be able to adapt 
itself freely to changing situations. Its 
influence has meant that American foreign policy ... 
has been a series of ad-hoc decisions ... rather 
than a steady developing policy ...
1. Politicians, Policy Makers, and Public Opinion 
Although the success of a political leader depends on 
his ability to identify, define, and control public opinion, 
there is no formula with which to decipher it. Quite often, 
these leaders cite the old adage that the "people speak with 
a single voice," and that they are reacting to this voice. 
However, the problem of accurately deciphering public opinion 
is often solved by the political leader using his own code 
to decipher it and then claiming his position is supported 
by the public will. How does he determine what the public
45
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will is? What is the result?
Public opinion may be expressed in many ways. The most 
frequently monitored expressions of public opinion are found 
in the editorial columns of the n a t i o n ’s newspapers, public
3opinion polls, and national elections. Editorials do not 
necessarily reflect the attitude of the newspaper readers, 
but the opinion and beliefs of the editor and owners of the 
newspapers are quite evident in the style with which they 
support - or fail to support - policy issues. These 
opinions can be transferred to the readers by assimilation 
through reading the press coverage given an issue in the 
paper. Prior to the widespread use of the electronic media 
of television and radio, the newspapers were the most impor­
tant media source of expressing and shaping public opinion. 
As Bernard C, Cohen states in The Press and Foreign P oli c y , 
"if we do not see a story in the newspapers, it effectively 
has not happened so far as we are concerned. One might 
conclude then that if the circulation of a newspaper remains 
high, the possibilities are good that the majority of the 
readers agree with the opinion on policy issues as presented 
in that paper's columns.
The second expression of public opinion that is used 
frequently is the public opinion poll. Many historians, 
political scientists, and others are skeptical as to the 
usefulness of polls. However, the science of polling has 
been refined and restructured In recent years. Polls are
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used extensively by political candidates and are seen as 
being valuable in three areas, according to American poll- 
taker, Louis Harris. First, polls give candidates a 
schematic breakdown of his political constituency indicating 
such features as race, religion, and occupational patterns. 
Second, polls indicate what the electorate thinks of the 
candidate as a public figure: is the candidate familiar to
the electorate, are they aware of the candidate's voting 
record, and what is their perception of his deficiencies?
The third area is the definition of issues. The voters may 
express in their own words h ow they believe the government 
should act, or they can select from lists and reply to 
specific questions.^
The three areas of assistance espoused by Harris will 
help the politician more accurately to determine the "slant" 
of his constituency on many issues. None of the foregoing 
statements mean, however, that policy makers are inclined 
to agree with the results of polls. Many politicians and 
policy makers use it as a political gimmick. One Congress­
man remarked:
Polling your people with questionnaires is a 
greater gimmick than mailing out free flower 
seeds ... everyone is fluttered to be asked his 
opinion on great issues.
In the area of foreign policy, polls are most useful when
large numbers of questions pertaining to a particular issue
have been asked over an extended period of time, thus permit ­
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ting the analyst to establish hopefully accurate trends in
. . 7cp inion.
Policy makers must be aware of these trends in public
opinion in order to develop better foreign policy which does
not cause public unrest. Trends in opinion may be caused
by social change, technological change, productivity, and
movements of the populace. These trends reflect the movement
of the forces of history in society and must be considered
8by all policy makers. A second and perhaps more dangerous
trend in opinion is the short run, hot blooded reaction to
what is in the news of the moment, or as political scientist
Gabriel Almond states:
... an overreaction to equilibrium in world 
politics ... when threats from abroad become 
grave and immediate Americans tend to break out 
of the private orbit and tremendous energies 
become available for foreign policy.
As an example of this trend, Almond cites the emotional 
fervor with which America entered World Wars 1 and II. The 
interpretations and considerations given these trends by the 
policy maker will determine, to a large degree, how success­
ful he is in pursuing policy initiative.
Perhaps the best expression of public opinion occurs 
during the national political elections. When an elected 
official is voted out of office, it is tantamount to a rejec­
tion of his policies, or a rejection of his support of 
policies not of interest to his electorate. A majority vote 
for a candidate usually reflects support for his action and
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opinion on topics of constituent interest, or at least 
considerable opposition to his opponent's views on those 
topics. This expression of support can be misleading, 
however, for in America approximately one— third of the 
electorate does not go to the polls. Many national elections 
are won primarily on domestic issues, and many elections are 
won by such small margins that they do not show accurately 
the overall public mood on any given issue. As a stable 
basis for policymaking, public opinion leaves much to be 
desired. It would be an unwise official who regards it as 
either needless or unimportant.
2. Theories on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
The quandry political leaders face concerning the role
of public opinion in national security and foreign policy
development is not theirs alone. Scholars for years have
been debating the role of public opinion and have failed to
come to a consensus of opinion regarding its place in the
policymaking process. A concept proposed by social scientist
C. Wright Mills maintains that all policy decisions should
be left in the hands of a few educated and competent
e l i t e s . T h i s  "power elite" concept holds that a few elite
individuals and groups govern America without direction from
the public, for they— the publi c— are incapable of sound
11judgment on policy issues. Geofrey C h a n d l e r ’s concept 
complements that of Mills in that Chandler believes much of
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the problem is due to Americans' "international illiteracy"; 
that is, Americans are not educated on international events. 
This lack of education leads to their inability to link 
external events to the well being of American society. These 
approaches as espoused by Mills and Chandler tend to charac­
terize public opinion as completely dysfunctional to the
12policy process.
Arguments favorable to public involvement in national 
policy development are also prevalent. Charles O. Lerche, 
Jr., in Foreign Policy of the American P e o p l e , states that 
when public opinion is directed towards international 
problems it becomes a positive, not negative, force. He 
maintains that public debate over major issues tends to 
clarify them; when policies reflect the public's view they 
may be more in line with national interests; and if the 
involvement of the public has been consistent then support 
for that policy will be stronger and sacrifices given more
13willingly in support of it.
J. William Fulbright , former chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, is also a proponent of the
importance of considering public support in the development
of foreign policy. In his book. The Crippled G i a n t ,
Fulbright states:
The success of a foreign policy, as we have 
been discovering, depends not only on the avalia­
bility of military and economic resources, but, 
at least,as much, upon the support given it by our 
p e op 1 e .
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Further support for an active public role in the policy 
process is found in Ralph B. L e v e r i n g 's work. The Pub lie 
and A m e r ican F ore ign Poli c y , 1918-1978. In this book,
Levering discounts Mill's and Chandler's statements about 
the inability of the American public to make sound judgments 
on foreign policy. Levering believes that:
Perhaps the most hopeful development during 
the past sixty years has been the increased 
sophistication of large portions of the public in 
regard to foreign affairs.
Levering gives credit for this development to the increased
level of education Americans have received since the 1930s
and the emergence of the electronic media of radio and
television as a widespread news source.
Levering proposes the idea that the use of differing
news sources or media by individuals has a significant impact
in regard to opinions on foreign policy issues. The level
of education an individual has attained is subsequently
reflected in the news information source utilized. A study
conducted in the late sixties found that forty percent of
college graduates and fifty percent of those with "some
college" were more dependent on periodicals for their news
information.^^ Individuals with a high school education or
less were more dependent on the electronic media for their
news while both groups relied on newspapers as supplemental
sources.
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Levering believes there is a danger in relying on any
one source for news information. Radio, television, and the
newspapers tend to provide only the basic information on an
issue and do not analyze it in depth. Additionally, because
of a lack of space and time, these sources provide news about
foreign affairs which stress "the exceptional rather than
17the significant." Periodicals, on the other hand, present 
a more detailed account of the issue, but they also may be 
biased and present a one sided version of the issue. To 
ensure a sound overall understanding of the world a round 
them, Americans must utilize all forms of news sources to 
provide themselves with facts to form an opinion.
As can be garnered from the foregoing discussion on 
public opinion, it is difficult to analyze accurately its 
role in policy development. Political scientist V. O. Key, 
Jr. states:
... the sharp definition of the role of 
public opinion as it affects different kinds of 
policies under different types of situations 
presents a n .analytical problem of extraordinary 
difficulty.
The true role of public opinion in policy development lies 
somewhere between the dysfunctional theory and the liberal 
democratic theory that foreign policy is merely a reflection 
of public preferences and belief. It may be more diffused 
than concentrated on matters of foreign policy for the public 
is slow to mobilize on these issues. However, when the 
public does mob i1i ze--a s it did in the late fifties in
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support of the government's hard line on Cold War issues and 
again in the late sixties and early seventies when public 
pressure contributed to the withdrawal of U.S. military 
forces in Indochina— it can stimulate or constrain the action 
of American policy makers. One might conclude that unless 
the public's interest is sparked by some external e v e n t , they 
may participate in policy development but do not lead it.
3. Functions of Public Opinion
Despite the arguments and lack of agreement concerning 
public opinion, there seems to be a consensus that there 
are three primary functions of public opinion in foreign 
policy development. They are:
1. Public opinion can constrain policy innovations.
2. Public opinion can stimulate policy innovations.
3. Public opinion can serve as a resource in policy
19innovâtion s .
America's overriding concern with domestic matters
has made it rather difficult for policy makers to develop
new and innovative foreign policies. This constraint on
policy initiatives need not be evidenced by actual public
refusal to support specific policies. If policy makers
even think the public may react and become mobilized against
policy changes, they may prevent any attempts to revise
20present policy for fear of electoral punishment. Public
opinion has, quite visibly, become a constraint on the use
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of military forces in response to international events.
Presently, it seems the public is ready to build military
power rather than apply it. In November 1981, thirty-four
percent of those polled favored an increase in defense
spending, while forty-seven percent wanted to maintain the
current level of defense spending. As to the commitment of
U.S. "combat" advisors to El Salvador, however, only about
21twenty percent of those polled favored it. Many other
examples are available in recent history; all point toward 
Americans constraining attitudes on the use of military 
force. Policy makers must take this into consideration; for 
even though military force is but one tool they possess, it 
is central to the execution of foreign and national security 
poli c y .
Policy makers attempt to manipulate public opinion to
their advantage. Historically, the public has tended to
support most governmental actions involving foreign policy
or international events once the policy was initiated. This
perceived passivity of the public has led presidents to act
first and seek public support later. Evidence of this action
occurred during the Vi etnam War when only forty-two percent
of the people polled favored President Johnson's policy in
1965 before he announced it. After he made it public,
22seventy-two percent of those surveyed approved it. A
contributing factor to this increase in approval was the 
Gulf of Tonkin incident where North Vietnamese patrol boats
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supposedly attacked U.S. destroyers. The actuality of this 
attack has come under investigation recently, but at the 
time, it was enough of an insult to the American people to 
stimulate their support for Johnson's increased military 
involvement in South Vietnam. Without this incident. Pre s i­
dent Johnson's desire to increase the American presence in 
Southeast Asia may have been constrained by public opinion.
Public opinion as a stimulus to policy innovation is 
a contradiction to proposals by some that the American 
public is apathetic toward foreign policy questions. True, 
it is the exception rather than the rule; but when the 
situation is seen by the American people as having an 
impact on t h e m , their actions may stimulate policy innova­
tion. Political scientists Charles Keg 1e y , Jr. and Eugene 
R. Wittkopf state that often "... with respect to an issue,
shifts in public preferences preceded foreign policy 
2 3change." They use as an example the issue of the entry
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the United
Nations (U.N.). In 1950, a survey showed less than fifteen
percent of the American public were in favor of admitting
the PRC to the U . N . By 1969» more than fifty percent favored
it. The decision by the U.S. to block further attempts by
the PRC to be admitted to the U.N. may have been caused by
this high level of public support favoring the admittance 
2 Lof the PRC. Also, as stated in Chapter One, the current
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"Nuclear Freeze" movement and reinitiation of arms talk at 
Geneva may be an outgrowth of the American peace movement. 
Public opinion may not cause policy change, but as political
I
scientist Milton Rosenberg states, a mobilized public can
indirectly influence policy change by altering "the image
of public opinion held by persons capable of affecting policy
decisions" or by changing "the image of public opinion held
25by the public itself." We might simply say that public 
attitude can act as a stimulus toward foreign policy 
decisions by influencing h o w  policy makers perceive the 
international environment impacts upon American society.
No matter h ow much one believes in the liberal demo ­
cratic vi ew that foreign policy must reflect the p u b l i c ’s 
desires, it would be a mistake to believe that the public 
attitude is not inf lu enc ed by poli cy mak er s . The 1eadership 
of a nation must be able to command public support, and 
American leaders are quite efficient at doing so. It is in 
this regard that public attitude becomes a resource to be 
used by decision makers in the international arena. In 
bargaining with other nations, a strong unified public 
opinion not only gives the official confidence but enables 
hi m  to use the excuse that the American public would not 
tolerate a proposed concession which goes against the pop u­
lar desires. As Keg 1ey and Wittkopf explain, by describing 
themselves as victims of popular preferences, "American
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statesmen may indeed gain considerable bargaining 
„261ev erage.
The foregoing observations may leave one confused and 
frustrated as to the actual place public opinion holds in 
the foreign and national security policy making process.
As mentioned before, the role opinion holds lies somewhere 
between decision makers paying no heed to the public in 
formulating their policies and the "democratic myth" that 
the public is the real ruler of the republic. The following 
statement by Richard R. Fag en will perhaps assist in clari­
fying the role of public opinion:
... the fact that this decisional process may not 
In reality originate in the will of the people 
does not diminish the significance or usefulness 
of symbolically casting the thresholdgQf national 
tolerance in terms of public opinion.
In other words, even though public opinion may be latent and
quiescent, it is included in the calculations made by
decision makers in foreign policy development.
Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk hoped that Americans
would come to the realization that foreign policy was a
concern to their well being. In an address to the attendants
at a Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association meeting, he
St re s s e d :
... never forget: Foreign policy is about you-.
It is about your home; your community; your 
safety, your well being, your chance to live a 
decent life to prepare a better world for your 
children.^®
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American attitudes tend to indicate they are beginning to 
distinguish the importance foreign policy has in relation 
to the security of America and the well being of American 
society. A survey of public attitudes on foreign policy 
issues sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
(CCFR) late in November 1978 concludes that Americans are 
placing more emphasis on America's role in world affairs. 
Foreign policy issues have not superseded domestic issues, 
but more and more Americans are realizing the relationship 
between world events and the lives of the American public.
In particular, the survey shows eighty-two percent of the 
public and seventy-two percent of the leaders consider United 
States foreign policy to have substantial impact on the value 
of the dollar; sixty-four percent of the public believe 
foreign policy impacts on food prices; and five percent on 
unemployment. Domestic concerns were still out front with 
67 percent of the public and 85 percent of the leaders 
reflecting inflation as their primary co ncern. The only 
area showing a substantial increase of concern was national 
security with 32 percent saying too little was spent on 
defense. This was up from 13 percent in 1974 and 8 percent 
in 1969.^^
This growing concern for world affairs and national 
defense has a definite effect upon the status of America's 
military forces. Charles L. Cochran describes it best:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
The military is identified in the public mind 
as the arm of the government to be used in the 
defense of critical national security requirements.
When national security policy enjoys a consensus 
of national support, the prestige of the military 
is assured to the extent it is tied to these "high" 
national goals. But the opposite is also true.
Whatever the extent of civilian control, when 
United States foreign and national policies are 
not supported by a clear majority of the popula­
tion, the military is as tied to the major military 
decisions as if they had been made by the Joint 
Chiefs ofogtaff, with a resulting decline in 
prestige.
Support for the military is, therefore, linked to the support 
foreign policy initiatives receive from the public. Those 
policies, in turn, are items of interest to the public when 
they pose a threat to the normal conduct of domestic 
affairs. Support for the military can then be said to 
fluctuate in reaction to the presence of a perceived need 
for military strength in relation to an international crisis 
or th r e a t .
It is this regard that the three functions of public 
opinion— constraint, stimulus, and resource— are exercised 
frequently. If a threat is not seen as dangerous or disrup­
tive to American society, the use and support of military 
forces and greater defense spending will be constrained.
If there is a perceived threat present affecting the normal 
conduct of affairs, public opinion may act as a stimulus to 
increase military strength, such as the increase in defense 
spending after the Iranian Hostage incident and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Last, public support for a strong
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military is a resource which statesmen can use to strengthen 
their request for more defense funding or to signal America's 
resolve to execute a general or specific foreign policy.
A military force cannot function without support from 
the public, especially in respect to the allocation of the 
nation's most valued resources— money and manpower. Support 
for the military can be identified by analyzing the wi lli ng ­
ness of society to assign these resources to the milita r y . 
Chapter Three will attempt to show a trend between the 
allocation of money for defense and the presence of an 
international threat or crisis.
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CHAPTER III 
THE DEFENSE BUDGET AND PUBLIC OPINION
It is customary in the democratic countries 
to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting 
with the requirements of social services. There 
is a tendency to forget that the most important 
social service a government can-do for its people 
is to keep them alive and free.
-British Air Marshall 
Sir John SI essor
Major policy issues in the United States today, be they
domestic or foreign, require support from the national
economy. Requirements of such policies must be met if they
are to succeed. National security requirements cannot be
considered apart from the nation's economic policy, for the
impact of one on the other is constant. During a major war,
resources are allocated to the military services based upon
need and the productive capacity of the nation's industry
and economy. In peacetime, or the absence of an overriding
threat, other considerations emerge as constraining factors—
such as, budgetary policy, the tax structure, demand for
public improvements, social programs, and the demand for
consumer goods and a higher standard of living. The end
result is that military requirements must be weighed against
other demands on the economy, and priorities must be estab-
1i sh e d .
A major instrument for balancing resources and require­
ments, for establishing a scale of national priorities, and 
for resolving and recording the plans, hopes, and decisions
63
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of national security policy is the annual federal budget. 
This is the P r e s i d e n t 's key tool for controlling and coordi­
nating the executive branch of the government along with the 
programs and policies it develops and implements. It
represents a compromise between domestic areas of national
2policy and those involving national security.
The direction national security policy will take is 
determined by the pattern of spending built into the 
budgetary process. Because of this sensitivity, civilian 
control over the allocation of resources to the military is 
the 1 ever by which officials seek to implement their under­
standing of the requirements of national security and 
exercise perhaps one of the most effective implements of
3civilian control over the military that exists. The end 
result is that allocation of economic, resources granted the 
defense establishment will shape the nation's military 
p rogram.
Who should determine proper military policy and the
size and content of the budget to support it? Dr. Paul
McCracken, Chairman of President Nixon's Council of Economic
Advisors, stated;
... we have to rely on the judgment of government 
officials chosen by the people in the belief that 
they have that good judgment, and reasonably 
represent the people's standard of values.
The American public does not have a direct effect on the
development of the national budget allocation, but their
desires and requirements are transmitted through elected
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representatives. Whether Americans believe their military 
is needed and important to their well being may be reflected 
in the fluctuations found in the defense budget. This chap­
ter will attempt to establish a trend between the willingness 
of Americans to allocate economic resources— money — to 
national defense and the perceived or actual presence of an 
external crisis.
1. Historical Perspective
The ultimate constraint on national security expendi­
tures is most directly related to the nation's Gross National 
Product (GNP)— which is the dollar value of all goods and 
services that could be produced by the nation in a given 
year. Prior to 1930, defense expenditures, with the excep­
tion of the World War 1 period, amounted to approximately 
one percent of the nation's GNP. By 1944, the percentage 
of GNP devoted to defense had increased to 35.5 percent.
In accordance with the American tradition of demobilizing 
after a w a r , defense expenditures by 1950 had decreased to
4.4 percent of the G N P .^ The size of the defense budget 
became a key issue in the n ew pattern of politics which came 
to focus on the allocation of resources between the public 
and private sector.
Since World II, each administration has had to satisfy 
"The Great Equation." This is the ever present question 
concerning how to "equate needed military strength with
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maximum economic strength."^ To do this, each administration 
must balance the allocation of resources between domestic 
programs, foreign policy programs— which include defense, 
tax limitation and reduction programs, and an attempt to 
balance the budget. Quite often, this balancing placed 
requirements for security against the physical capacity of 
the nation's economy and failed to consider the needs of 
domestic, tax, or other budget programs. The impact of this 
spending on defense is one too diverse and complicated to 
be fully understood. Defense expenditures have tested the 
limits of the nation's economic and political capabilities. 
American military expenditures are Intended to defend 
America's national security. They should be large enough 
to deter enemies but not so large as to strain the domestic 
order or to threaten other nations into expanding their 
military in order to deter u s .^ Not only do the pressures 
and needs of domestic programs influence the defense budget, 
but also external influences and tensions cause a fluctuation 
in support for defense spending.
Threats based upon external crisis influence defense 
spending, in so far as they are perceived and responded to 
by the Administration and the public. Post-World War II 
responsibilities and occupation duties caused America to 
maintain a much larger than normal military establishment 
in peacetime. After 1949, the continuing moves of the Soviet 
Union a round the world and the growth of anti -communism in
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the United States caused the size of the American military 
to continue to grow. Throughout American history the size 
of the military and the allocation of resources in support 
of it has varied almost directly with the actual or perceived
Opresence of war or the threat of it. In Samuel Huntington's 
The Common D e f e n s e , he described the evolution of the Amer i­
can defense effort from 1940-1960 in eleven periods. They 
a re :
1. Demobilization: Arp i1 1945-June 1 94 7 . After 1945,
defense expenditures declined after V. J. and V.
E. Day and finally bottomed out in 1947 at an 
annual rate of 10.3 billion dollars.
2. Stability: July 1947-J une 194 8. Defense expendi­
tures during FY 1948 varied from 10.7 billion 
dollars to 11.5 billion. The desire for a balanced 
budget and needs of the European recovery program 
caused strict ceilings to be placed on defense 
spending.
3. Spring Crisis Rearmament: July 1 948-Sept ember 19 4 9. 
Soviet movements in Czechoslovakia and against 
Berlin sparked a rising fear of war and stimulated 
the Congress into securing selective service legis­
lation and additional defense appropriations. A 
peak in defense spending of 14 billion dollars in 
the summer of 1949 resulted from this resurgence
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of Soviet aggression.
4. Economy Drive: October 1949-J une 1950. The easing 
of the Berlin Crisis, the tax reduction of 1948, 
the role of the "Fair Deal" program in the election 
of 1948, and the rising expenditures of the European 
Economic Cooperation caused a shift towards 
budgetary economy.
5. Korean War Rearmament: July 1950-J une 1953• A
sustained three year increase in national security 
expenditures from 12 billion dollars in 1950 to 50.5 
billion in the second quarter of 1953 resulted from 
the Korean Crisis.
6. Post-Korean Decline: July 1953-December 1954. As 
with the earlier American wars, once peace was 
attained national defense spending declined. An 
increased emphasis on nuclear weapons, cutbacks in 
conventional forces, and major tax reductions 
resulted in a budget low of 38.4 billion dollars 
or 11.3 percent of the GNP being spent for defense 
at the end of 1954.
7. Stability: January 1955-J une 1956. The Post-Korean
War decline in defense spending was followed by an 
eighteen month stabilization in defense spending
of approximately 38-39 billion dollars or about
9.5 percent of the GNP. Continued emphasis was 
placed on cutbacks in conventional forces and the
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increase for missiles and other nuclear weapons.
8. Administrative Increase: July 1956-J une 1957.
During 1957, defense expenditures climbed to 44.9 
billion dollars. This was not the result of planned 
programs but rather from the increases in prices, 
accelerated payments to contractors, and a more 
speedy than anticipated delivery of weapons.
9. Economy Drive: July 1957-December 1957. This
unplanned increase (period 8) was followed almost 
immediately by a planned decrease. Severe cuts 
were made in personnel, and strict spending guide­
lines i mp o s e d .
10. Sputnik Expansion: January 1958-J une 1 9 5 9 . The 
advent of the Soviet's Sputnik and the beginning 
of an American recession caused a reversal in the 
drive for economy. Within a fifteen month period, 
defense related expenditures rose from 44 billion 
dollars in 1958 to 46.2 billion dollars in the 
second quarter of 1959. Increases were initiated 
in missile programs and other scientific related
a r ea s .
11. Uneasy Stability: July 1959-December I960. Concen­
trated efforts of the Administration tended to 
stabilize spending as expenditures dropped to 44.7 
billion dollars in I960, Later in I960, the break
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up of the Paris Summit talks and the U-2 incident
9caused spending to start climbing upward.
During these periods, with the exception of periods 8 and 
9, the presence of an actual or perceived external threat 
helped to stimulate an increase in defense spending. When 
there was not an apparent threat, a decline in defense 
allocations was evident. This pattern continued into the 
1960s and 70s.
In i9 6 0 , defense expenditures amounted to 9 percent of 
America's GNP. Gallup polls during I960 showed that 18 
percent of those polled believed too much was being spent 
on defense, while 45 percent considered defense spending 
about right and 21 percent not e n o u g h . A s  the Kennedy 
administration took office, turbulence in the developing 
nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America combined with the 
growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities prompted an increase 
in U.S. defense expenditures. The theory of "Massive 
Retaliation'" was inadequate to deal with the new "wars of 
national liberation," and the advanced nuclear arsenals of 
the U.S. and Soviet Union made general war too costly to be 
considered. President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense 
McNamara realized the need for America's military to be able 
to respond to any crisis with the appropriate level of force 
This flexible response doctrine initiated a rebuilding of 
conventional forces and a strengthening of America's nuclear
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arsenal. However, all this rebuilding was accomplished at 
a cost. Defense spending in the first three years of the 
Kennedy Administration rose from 42.8 billion dollars in 
I960 to 50 billion in 1963.  ̂̂ The occurrence of the Cuban 
crisis, consisting of the Bay of Pigs debacle in April 1961 
and the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, was a contri­
buting factor to this increase. These two events combined 
to refortify in the American mind the ever present threat 
of Soviet incursions into the Western Hemisphere and in­
creased A m e r i c a ’s resolve to support a strong military to 
protect their interests. Additionally, troubles in Southeast 
Asia prompted President Kennedy to increase both military and 
economic aid to South Vietnam in 1963. Military advisors 
were sent in, but the actual deployment of combat units did 
not occur. The final allocation for defense in 1964 showed
only a slight 1.2 billion dollar increase over the 1963 
12allocat i o n .
In November 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated 
and Vice President Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency of 
the United States. Approximately a year later. North 
Vietnamese patrol boats purportedly attacked U.S. naval 
warships in the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam. 
This event led to the Southeast A s i a — or Tonkin G u l f —  
Resolution which reemphasized that the U.S. had no ambitions 
in Southeast Asia but rather that the U.S. wished the 
populace of that area to "... be left in peace to work out
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1 1their own destinies in their own w a r . ” It also authorized
the President to initiate such measures as he determined 
necessary to protect American forces and was likened by some 
as tantamount to an official declaration of war. An exchange 
between Senators John Sherman Cooper and J. W. Fulbright 
best demonstrates this attitude:
Cooper: In other words, we are now giving the
President advanced authority to take 
whatever action he may deem necessary?
Fulbright: 1 think that is correct.
Cooper: Then looking ahead, if the President
decided that it was necessary to use 
such force as could lead into war, 
we will give that authority by this 
resolution?
F u l b r i g h t : That is the way I would interpret it.
Even with the Tonkin Gulf incident, an increase in defense 
spending did not occur until 1966. Defense budget alloca­
tions for 1964 and 1965, respectively, were 51.2 billion 
dollars and 47.4 billion dollars. By 1966, however, American 
involvement in Vietnam included actual combat forces, 
increased military and economic aid to South Vietnam, and 
a national commitment in Vietnam which would affect all 
aspects of American society for years to come.
With the escalation of the Vietnam War, federal budget 
considerations were oriented a round the defense establishment 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Defense expenditures 
continued to increase through 1969. By 1969, public opinion 
began to express a very low sentiment in favor of increased 
defense spending. Vietnam was becoming a long war, and long
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wars - especially those which were not popular (to begin 
with) - soon sour the nation against increased involvement. 
American support for the United States taking an active role 
in foreign affairs had risen 13 percent from 1947 to 1965.
But from 1965 to 1975 an 18 percent drop was noted— due, 
most logically, to the nation's involvement in Vietnam and
the impact it had on domestic policies and American
. * 15society.
Vietnam also marked a turn in the moderately "hawkish" 
approach America had followed in defense spending starting 
in the early 1950s and continuing into the late 1960s. Data 
obtained from Gallup Polls in I960 indicated that 18 percent 
of those polled felt too much was being spent on defense;
45 percent thought it was about right ; and 21 percent 
believed too little was being spent on defense. By 1969,
52 percent answered too much ; 31 percent about right; and
8 percent too little. After 1969, a gradual shift began 
heading toward, but not reaching, pre-Vietnam sentiments on 
spending. By 1974, 47 percent of those polled maintained 
that the right amount was being spent on defense versus 32 
percent believing too much was expended. Polls in 1978 
reflected an even stronger shift towards support for defense 
spending with only 16 percent of those polled maintaining 
too much was being spent versus 45 percent believing spending 
for defense was about right and 32 percent believing too
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2. Public Response to International Crisis 
It is clear that public opinion after 1973 began a 
trend back to supporting a more assertive role for America 
in foreign affairs. This trend was complemented by a deter­
mination to strengthen weakened military capabilities.
This trend is well documented by the responses to thirty-
eight national surveys conducted since late 1968. The
1 7results of these surveys are depicted in Table 1. The 
question asked in all surveys (the wording was sometimes 
varied slightly) was structured as follows:
There is much discussion as to the amount of 
money the government in Washington should spend 
for national defense and military purposes. How 
do you feel about this? Do you think we are 
spendin^gtoo little, too much, or about the right 
amount ?
As expressed earlier, the period from 1969 to 1973 showed 
a low sentiment among Americans for increased defense spend­
ing beginning to appear. From 1977 on, poll results show 
an even stronger increase in public sentiment favoring 
increased defense spending. Gradual shifts in the poll 
results reflect normal fluctuations in attitude towards 
defense, but there are some abrupt shifts which are a reac­
tion to some external crisis or stimulant.
The variation between surveys found in the "Too Little" 
column are most important. Many Americans have the impres-
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TABLE 1
PUBLIC PREFERENCES FOR INCREASED OR
REDUCED U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING, 1969-1981*
Too LittleSurvey Date
Defense Spending? 
Too Much About Right
AIPO 784 7/69 53% 38% 9%AIPO 793 - 11/69 46 47 7AIPO 814 9/70 49 40 11AIPO 825 3/71 50 39 11Harris 10/71 49 40 11AlPO/Potomac 8/72 42 49 9Harris 8/72 38 51 11AIPO 864 2/73 42 50 8AIPO 878 9/73 46 41 13AlPO/Potomac 4/74 37 46 17AIPO 914 9/74 44 44 12Harris/CCFR* 12/74 44 44 12NBC 12/75 41 34 25AIPO 945 1/76 36 42 22AIPO/Po tomac 5/76 24 48 28Harris 12/76 32 55 13NBC 12/76 41 33 26AIPO 979 7/77 23 50 27NBC 10/78 21 51 28AIPO/CCFR 11/78 16 52 32NBC 12/78 22 54 24NBC 9/79 16 46 38AIPO 1145-G 12/79 21 45 34NBC 12/79 9 40 51
NBC 1/80 8 29 63CBS/New York Times 1/80 14 40 46
AIPO 1147-G . 1/80 14 43 49
CBS/New York Times 3/80 5 18 76
NBC 3/80 13 32 55
AIPO 1186-G 1-2/81 15 35 50
*Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, as cited In Bruce Russet
and Donald R. Deluca, "Don't Tread on Me: Public Opinion and Foreign
Policy In the Eighties," Political Science Quarterly 96 (Fall 1981): 
p. 383.
Questions for CBS/New York Times January 1980 and all AIPO questions 
except September 1970, August 1972, April 1974, May 1976, and November 
1978 are Identical with questions given In test; others differ trivially. 
The AIPO/Potomac question asked whether "spending for defense and mili­
tary purposes should be Increased, kept at the present level, reduced, 
or ended altogether?" The percentage of people responding "too much" 
in the above table Includes both "reduced" and "ended altogether."
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sion that budgetary matters are out of their grasp and there­
fore rely on their elected officials to do what is correct. 
This passivity, or perhaps rather a lack of concern, is 
reflected in the "About Right" column, which is more stable 
than the other two. The importance of the "Too Little" 
column is that should the percentages increase more Ameri­
cans are reflecting their willingness to sacrifice personal 
well being for the well being of the whole society.
In examining the events surrounding some of the abrupt 
increases in preferences favoring increased spending, we 
usually find an external crisis or event which contributed 
to the change in sentiment. The abrupt increase favoring 
spending between the polls in February 1973 and April 197A 
was undoubtedly stimulated by the Arab-1sraeli War in October 
1973 and the ensuing Arab oil embargo. There still was not 
the overriding majority in favor of more defense spending, 
but preference percentages saying "Too Little" was being 
spent never again dropped to the 196A low of 8 percent. 
Percentages indicating those who believed "Too Much" was 
being spent never again rose to the 1973 high of 46 per- 
cant.19
Other abrupt changes providing evidence that external 
crises influence public opinion on defense spending are quite 
evident throughout the remaining polls depicted in Table 1. 
Most prominent, perhaps, is the poll response between the 
NBC poll taken in August 1979 and the one taken in December
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1979. The decrease in those saying "Too Much" from 16 to 
9 percent and the increase of those saying "Too Little" from 
38 to 51 percent was an abrupt change of opinion stimulated 
by the Iranian hostage crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan 
by the Soviet Union. Agreement on this assumption is almost 
unanimous among political scientists and historians. Public 
reaction to Iran and Afghanistan may not have been a pivotal 
event in American defense spending, but it accelerated the 
trends of American resurgence to world power and a willing­
ness to increase defense spending. Even American liberals 
polled showed support for higher defense expenditures. 
Americans identifying themselves as liberals in 1979 showed 
only 47 percent in favor of increased spending versus 67 
percent in January 1980 after the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. The liberal community was once strongly anti­
war: this recent shift may be one of the most important
20effects of the Afghan-1 ranian crisis.
Preferences in favor of increased defense spending 
cannot be linked solely with external events. The reversal 
in attitudes on defense expenditures since 1973 has been 
influenced by four interconnected changes. The first change 
which has had a definite impact on attitudes toward defense 
has been the decline in influence of the results of the 
Vietnam War. This decline is marked not only by the gradual 
rise in sentiments favoring increased arms spending but
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also by a renewed confidence in the military and the g overn­
ment. Confidence in the military is interlinked with
attitudes on military spending regardless of political 
21views. The Vietnam-era generation, once associated in
politics with thinking that too much is being spent on 
defense, is no longer distinctive and does not have the 
effect it once did. There is still a desire in America to 
avoid commitments in certain parts of the world, but the 
isolationist attitude evident after Vietnam has almost 
disappeared. Americans are now more willing to support 
efforts to defend U.S. interests in high priority areas of 
the world.
A second change affecting attitudes toward defense 
spending is changing ideology. The liberal views of the 
early 1970s have decreased, and there is a rise in elements 
of conservative ideology. The United States has seen an 
increase in the proportion of people favoring capital punish­
ment and willing to identify themselves as conservatives.
More and more issues of morality and military preparedness 
are being linked together by a growing group known as the 
"Moral Majority." Sentiment toward the continuation of 
social welfare programs has increased but so have attitudes 
in favor of their reduction and the placing of more stringent 
controls on them. All of these changes in the ideological
climate are supportive of increased spending for defense and
23a way of expressing a growth of conservatism in America.
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An increase in anti-Soviet and anti-communist attitudes 
since 1973 is the third change which has produced increased 
support for defense spending. Cooperation with the Soviet 
Union in the area of detente was hoped for by many 
Americans in the early 1970s. This cooperation was viewed 
by many as a one-way street with America doing the 
cooperating and the Soviets winning many of the negotiations 
With the failure or stalemate of the Strategic Arms Limita­
tion Treaty (SALT) talks and increased Soviet activity 
throughout the world, hope for cooperation declined. There 
also has been a growing perception among Americans that U.S. 
military strength is weakening, and America has retreated 
from its dominant position in world affairs. In 1978, 56
percent of those polled perceived the U.S. falling behind 
the Soviet Union in military strength, and 69 percent of 
those favored increased military spending. In 1965, fewer 
than 38 percent of the poll respondents believed Soviet 
power would increase; this belief rose to 63 percent in 
1977-^^
The emergence of America's attempt to reassert itself 
both militarily and politically in the world is the fourth 
change contributing to increased support for defense spend­
ing. In an attempt to document America's move towards 
reasserting itself in the world, Bruce Ru s set t and Donald 
R. Deluca maintain that one reason for this change is:
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Americans, in wishing to increase the share 
of resources devoted to military purposes, are 
responding to world events at least to their
perceptions of world events.
Ru s set t and Deluca validate their hypothesis by examining
results of polls asking Americans what they consider the
9 A"most important problem" facing the country. They d is­
covered that in the 1950s and 1960s foreign affairs and 
national security were found to be of most concern to 
Americans with 50-60 percent of those polled placing their 
greatest fears on the possibility of war and communism. 
Later, in the 1960s, overriding interest was reflected in 
the civil rights movement but was soon replaced with concern 
over Vietnam. The ending of the Vietnam War caused American 
interests to return to more domestic issues - primarily 
inflation - and to the economy. Beginning in late 1973, a 
gradual increase in the resurgence of concern over foreign 
affairs was observed. This increase was closely paralleled 
by the return of strong public sentiment in favor of 
increased defense spending to meet a "sense of threat"
emanating from abroad. This trend in both areas is depicted 
27in Figure 1. As before, abrupt changes in preference for
more defense spending can be said to be triggered, in part, 
by external stimuli. The rapid shift in spending attitudes 
and concern for foreign affairs can also be related to 
political and domestic circumstances or to events which any 
sensible American would take into account when forming an 
op ini on .
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Public Preferences for Increased or Reduced U.S. Defense Spending, 1969-1981*
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*Source: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations as cited in Bruce
Russet and Donald R. Deluca, "Don’t Tread on Me: Public Opinion
and Foreign Policy in the Eighties," Political Science Quarterly 
96 (Fall 1981): p. 322.
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3. Summa ry
In the international environment, military force is an 
instrument to be applied as the foreign environment appears 
to require it. The four changes addressed in this chapter 
have all effected the change of public sentiments toward 
defense spending and America's role in international affairs. 
Domestic politics also cannot be underrated in its influence 
on foreign policy. Foreign policy options and the levels 
of resources available for external use greatly influence 
A m e r i c a ’s ability to cope effectively with external threats
2 gto core values. Support for increased defense spending
is stimulated by the presence of an external threat or 
crisis which is perceived by the American people and govern­
ment as affecting the normal course of domestic affairs.
The federal budget is an indicator of the nation's priorities 
by the allocation of resources it assigns to domestic and 
international politics. The b u d g e t , in turn, is developed 
and approved by officials who must at least consider, if not 
follow, the desires and requirements placed upon them by the 
American public who elected them. Senator J. William F ul­
bright again provides perhaps the best statement linking the 
budget and national priorities:
Far from being a dry accounting of book­
keepers, a nation's budget is full of moral impli­
cations; it tells what a society does and doe^g 
not care about; it tells what its values are.
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As demonstrated throughout the chapter, the presence 
of an external threat contributes to fluctuations in defense 
spending, public support towards these expenditures, and 
public opinion on what is America's most important problem 
and priority. Here again, public opinion acts as a con­
straint, a stimulus, and a resource for policy makers.
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CHAPTER IV 
PUBLIC OPINION AND MILITARY SERVICE
Those who expect to reap the blessings of 
freedom must I^ke men, undergo the fatigue of 
support ing it.
Thomas Paine
American society has supported its nation's military
through allocation of the two resources which are addressed
in this thesis— money and manpower. The former is relatively
easy to measure, so many dollars having the power to purchase
equipment and to hire and develop the human resources needed
to make the military machine run, and if need be fight.
Notwithstanding, manpower is more than a matter of money.
Motivation of an individual to sign on with an organization
is stimulated by more than financial awards. Psychic
awards, such as job satisfaction, sense of purpose, and life
style are also influences acting upon an individual to join
an organization. It is true that money will buy manpower
and talent, but the satisfaction of the psychic needs of an
2individual must also be addressed.
Manpower is no doubt the most valuable resource a 
nation possesses. Without sufficient human resources, a 
nation will be unable to carry out national economic, domes­
tic, or foreign policy programs. Manpower produces all 
subsequent required resources and reinforces the projection 
of the n a t i o n ’s policies throughout the world. During 
World War II, the decline of Nazi Germany's manpower 
reserves contributed heavily to its final defeat. The drain
86
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on manpower contributed not only to the decreased efficiency 
of Germany's military but also to the decreased efficiency 
of its industrial base.
This chapter will deal with the capability of America 
to obtain the required human resources needed to man its 
military forces and the factors influencing this. Economic, 
social, and external threats will be addressed attempting 
to establish that public attitude towards military service 
is an indication of overall support for the military 
establishment.
1. Historical Perspective
For most of its history, manpower procurement in America 
has been a blend of conscription and a volunteer system.
The idea of a nation of volunteers has attracted favorable 
response down through the y e a r s , for it is seen as more in 
tune with A m e r i c a ’s democratic principles. Conscription 
infringes on individual liberties and is an abomination in 
a nation comprised of free men. Compulsory military service, 
however, has been used frequently throughout the history of 
the United States but with only limited popularity. It has 
only been seen as acceptable to a majority of the American 
people when its need was clearly demonstrated as in World 
War II. When this need was not evident, or when the applica­
tion seemed inequitable, as during the Vietnam War, compul­
sory military service has been the center of heated debates
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and the fragmentation of American society.
Compulsory military service, or conscription, has 
probably existed as long as there have been organized armies. 
Moses was instructed by the Lord to take all males twenty 
years old and upward and send them forth to war, and the 
Greek city states all practiced conscription to man their 
armies. Conscription in America originated in the mobiliza­
tion of free men in England resulting in the establishment 
of the English militia system. As historian Russell Wei g 1ey 
states, the militia system was "transplanted to America and
3nourished, hereafter, it became moribund in England itself."
The militia system was used throughout the American 
Revolution. When George Washington became the first Presi­
dent of the United States, he requested the establishment 
of an Army based on general conscription. Congress failed 
to act on this request because of the f ear of large standing 
armies. President Madison, during the War of 1812, also 
requested the conscription of men for the military, but 
again it was disapproved. It was not until the Civil War 
years that the subject again would come up. It was the 
Confederacy which approached the issue of conscription first 
in 1862, followed by the North in 1863. The direct effects 
of the Civil War draft were limited. Only about 6 percent 
of the manpower used in the war were draftees.^
Conscription and the draft again disappeared after the 
Civil War and reappeared when the United States became
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involved in World War I. Congress passed the Selective 
Service Act of 1917» which established a truly national 
system of conscription. It was an effective system during 
World Wars 1 and 11 and continued to operate throughout the 
1960s and early 1970s with the last man entering the Army 
by way of the draft on 30 June 1973.^
Activity against the draft itself was not overtly 
visible until the escalation of the war in Vietnam. After 
World War 11, the draft ceased but was left in "standby" 
status. With the advent of the Korean War and the problems 
with mobilization for that conflict, a Universal Military 
Training (UMT) and Service Act was adopted in 1951 after only 
four days of debate. This established the Selective Service 
system used until 1973 but also required that the UMT Act 
be reviewed and extended every four years. Since 1951, the 
draft extension has been passed by the Congress four times—  
1955, 1959, 1963 , and 1967— with only one day debate on the
issue. It was not until President Nixon requested a two 
year extension of the draft in 1971 that political discussion 
over this issue increased. After three days of debate in 
the House and over a month of debate in the Senate, the 
extension was finally approved by a 293 to 99 roll call vote 
in the House and a 72 to 16 roll call vote in the Senate.
This was the first time since 1951 that over 44 Representa­
tives and 5 Senators voted against the extension.^ This 
turnaround in attitudes concerning the draft was sparked by
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related outside events which influenced the Congressional 
debate. The revealing of the secret Pentagon papers on the 
history of the Vietnam War, the trial and conviction of Army 
L i eut enan t William Calley for the My Lai ma s sacre of Viet — 
namese civilians, the North Vietnamese offer to negotiate 
on mutual troop withdrawals and repatriation of prisoners, 
heavy lobbying pressure by coalitions supporting an end to 
the draft and the Vietnam War all caused the Congressmen to 
take a more critical look at the Vietnam War, the draft, and
7the possibility of an all volunteer military force. It 
must be remembered that these same events also affected 
public attitudes; and the public, in turn, will direct their 
desires and requirements towards their elected officials who 
are to act in accordance with their electorate's wants. It 
can safely be assumed, therefore, that the concern shown for 
extending the draft by the politicians was a reflection of 
the public unrest during the Vietnam years towards the 
inequities of the draft and the American involvement in 
V i etnam.
Public unrest against the draft started in 1965 with 
President Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam War. Public 
demonstrations against the draft grew more and more numerous 
as America became increasingly involved in Vietnam. With 
these events and the subsequent political pressures placed 
on the administration by the public. President Nixon 
appointed an advisory commission to study the possibility
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Oof an all volunteer armed force in March 1969. Former
Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates Jr. was nominated to 
head the commission. The President charged the Gates C o mmis­
sion, as it was to become known, with developing "... a 
comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and moving 
toward an all volunteer force.
The Gates Commission submitted its report in February 
1970 stating the following points:
1. The nation would be better served by an all 
volunteer force supported by a standby draft.
2. Steps should be taken promptly to move in 
that directi o n .
3. The first step is to ” ... remove the inequity 
in the pay of men serving their first term in 
the armed forces."
L,. They believed an all volunteer force would
benefit America an^^not endanger its 
national security.
By 1972, registration for the draft ceased, and in 1973 the 
All Volunteer Force {A V F ) was brought into being.
The rebellion against the draft may have been against 
the Vietnam War itself and the draft an outlet for public 
frustration about the war. Whatever the case, the Selective 
Service System was a casualty of the war in Southeast Asia, 
and the AVF a p r o d u c t .
The AVF is not the cure-all it was hoped to be; it too 
has its problems. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird 
stated the position of the AVF in his final report to C o n ­
gress in January 1973. He said:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
if the Department of Defense has the full support 
of Congress and the full support of the American 
people in assuring that those who serve in the 
military profession receive the respect, recogni­
tion, and compensation that they deserve, we will 
be able to have an All-Volunt eer Force.
The support referenced by Mr. Laird has been forthcoming
only partially. Financially, the Defense Budget has been
allowed to increase the provision for the additional funds
needed to pay an AVF. Soldiers' wages have increased (in
current dollars) from a total of 12.3 billion dollars in
1964 to 30.3 billion dollars in 1981, while the number of
12servicemen has declined. These increased wages have
resulted in what some maintain is a force manned by
minorities, low skill and low intel1ectual-1evel individuals,
drug abusers, and alcoholics. Some of these charges are
true. Prior to the end of conscription in 1973, the average
American soldier read at the eleventh grade level. Today
the reading level of the average soldier in the AVF has
dropped to the fifth grade level. Also, the AVF has a
disproportionate percentage of minorities when compared to
the overall society, almost 36 percent of the soldiers in
1 3the AVF are black. With these shortcomings, the AVF is
truly reliant upon public support as Mr. Laird mentioned and 
on the uncertainty of the nation's economic situation and 
attitudes toward the Armed Forces.
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2. Public Opinion and Military Service— Why Serve?
The attitudes of the American public from revolutionary 
days to the age of d/tente have dictated the size, purpose, 
and character of America's forces. It is the public's 
perception of the importance and relevance of a large 
military force to ensure national security that continues 
to provide the quality and texture of that force.
These attitudes, however, are influenced by many 
catalysts as stated earlier. Throughout the draft years 
from 1946-1973, many young Americans entered the Armed 
Forces for educational benefits obtained through the G.I. 
Bill, travel, a change of life style, and as a step upward 
on the great American mobility ladder. Others were motivated 
to enlist (volunteer) by the threat of the draft itself.
Most of the draftees served in Army combat units for a 
period of two years. Enlistees could choose their branch 
of service— Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, or Coast Guard. 
Also, those who enlisted stood a much better chance of 
receiving training in a high technology or skill area which 
would assist them in a civilian career. Enlistees did have 
to serve for at least three years versus two for draftees.
This draft motivation was quite strong in the young men 
of the draft era. A Department of Defense study conducted 
in 1964 showed 43.2 percent of all first term enlistees 
surveyed stated that the draft was the primary motivation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
94
for their enlisting in the Armed Forces. Another survey 
conducted in 1969 revealed 49.7 percent of those enlistees 
surveyed maintained the draft was the primary motivation 
behind their e n l i s t i n g . T h o s e  who were not motivated by 
the draft had other reasons. Listed below in table two are 
some of these reasons:
Table 2
Reasons for enlisting in the Armed Forces other than 
to "beat the draft."*
P e rcent 
Answering
1. Training and educational opportunities
2. A desire to become more mature and 
self reli ant
of my choosing
 s 22
11
ces 12
i f e 16
t ime 49
St : Sk i11ed
Press , 1968 ) , p~̂  11 .
None of the surveys available indicated a desire to serve 
based upon external influences such as Vietnam or the 
Communist threat. Also, no opinion polls or surveys were 
located asking civilians similar questions concerning what 
would motivate them to enlist.
The draft had been such a part of American life that 
it was automatically taken into consideration when planning
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an individual's future. Fathers, brothers, teachers, etc., 
had almost all experienced military service because of the 
draft; therefore, military service was seen as a civic 
obligation by the young. A sense of duty to the nation and 
a feeling of honor and pride at having served in the Armed 
Forces helped to unite Americans. A large majority of Ameri 
can males had helped protect their freedoms, and once they 
looked back on their service they considered it —  on the most 
part— a positive and meaningful period in their life. A 
feeling of earning the freedoms they enjoyed was a result. 
With the end of the draft and the stigma military service 
obtained during the Vietnam War, this sense of civic obliga­
tion faded away.
Today's AVF has adapted the business approach to 
attracting young men and women into the service. Extra 
funds are sought not only for weapons and wages by the 
Pentagon but also for publicity and advertisements. During 
the draft years, an expansion of military forces was 
accomplished by increasing the draft call up. One of the 
major concerns arising from the use of an all volunteer 
system is the military's capability to maintain adequate 
levels of manpower to perform its mission effectively.
While the con script ive force was concerned with the alloca­
tion of manpower, the AVF is concerned first with the 
attraction of personnel and then the allocation of manpower. 
Also, it must be remembered that the AVF, because it is not
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a conscriptive force, is more susceptible to trends and
concerns within society and, therefore, must be constantly
1 Sconcerned with its reputation and standing in society.
Thus, advertising campaigns and multi-media blitzes have 
become almost as important to national security as reliable 
weapon s .
Americans today who want not only well paying careers 
but also respected ones tend to steer clear of the military 
except as a last resort. In a 1979 survey, less than 10 
percent of 17,000 high school seniors thought the military 
was a desirable occupation. Of college bound respondents, 
only 5 percent believed the military was a desirable career. 
Overall, about 50 percent of all seniors surveyed thought 
military service was not an acceptable c a r e e r . T h i s  
attitude has led to a volunteer force whose composition is 
seriously affected by the national unemployment rate. As 
long as the jobless rate stands at an exceptionally high 
level, the armed forces will have little difficulty attract­
ing the quantity of volunteers needed. Unemployment assists 
military recruiting in two ways. First is the prospect of 
some probability of unemployment causing the individual to 
consider military service more seriously as an alternate job. 
Second, for those directly affected by unemployment, military 
service may be the only visible means for economic survival. 
Studies linking unemployment rates and military service
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suggest that a 15 percent reduction in youth unemployment
causes between a 3 to 7-5 percent decline in military 
1 7recruiting.
In the seven year history of the AVF, the Army has
achieved its recruiting objective only three times. Once
during the peak unemployment years of 1975 and 1976, and
again in 1980 following the Iranian hostage crisis and the
18Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 1980 increase was 
also due to three other factors, according to Lawrence J.
K o r b , Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. These 
three factors consisted of a relatively high unemployment 
rate particularly among the young; some recruiting innova­
tions: and the Army's willingness to accept large numbers
of high school dropouts and people who scored low on the
1 9entrance aptitude tests. The influences of the two
external crises can only be assumed until a more extensive 
analysis of America's reaction to them can be completed.
One might postulate that the real reaction stemmed primarily 
from the Iranian Crisis, and the Afghanistan Crisis acted 
as an additional catalyst. The seizing of American civi1ians 
without provocation may be construed by the public as a more 
visible insult to their national pride and violates the 
freedoms so valued by Americans. This insult could have 
acted as the influence to cause the crusading spirit of 
Americans to be awakened and thus resulted in the increase 
of enlistments in the Armed Forces. Again, this was
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definitely not the only reason but may have been a contri­
buting factor.
An additional problem facing the AVF is competition 
with the civilian labor market. When this market demands 
additional manpower, this increases the military's problems 
by not only affecting quantity but also qua 1i ty of personnel. 
Increased trends toward more technologically advanced systems 
in both the military and civilian market place have caused 
increased competition for the educated youth of America.
The Navy and Air Force are looked upon by most people as 
better sources of technical training and experience; and 
since the AVF came into being, they have only failed to meet
their personnel objective four times for the Navy and only
20one time for the Air Force. The Army and Marines have
been particularly hard hit, for technical training in these
services is seen as less possible than in the other two
services by prospective recruits. The need for better
educated soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines is important
for the continued security of the nation. As Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower Lawrence Korb states:
The most important military manpower questions 
for the 1980s are rather: are we recruiting
and retaining enough high quality people to meet 
our national security requirements, and what 
steps must we take to ensure that w e 2Y^11 be 
able to do so throughout the decade.
Military personnel who have not had a sound educational
background will be an additional burden on the already
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strained military school system used to teach low-skill level 
recruits high-tech jobs. Competition for these educated 
17-21 year olds will become increasingly intense considering 
the overall decrease in young men in that age group. The 
projected population of 17-21 year old males in 1987 is
9 9estimated to be 9.2 million versus 10.8 million in 1978.
The problems of the AVF are not the type that can be 
cured quickly. They can be solved only partially by economic 
incentives to bring in more and better soldiers. Economic 
incentives for military service are only an attraction, for 
military service is quite different from other occupations 
because soldiers are expected to support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States and all it stands for unto 
death if need b e — an act for which no economist or managerial 
expert has yet devised financial or career incentives. The 
overriding solution must come from within society, for 
military service in a democracy is the obligation of a 
citizen for it is the military which protects his rights and 
freedoms. When all understanding of a citizen's duty to his 
nation disappears, then the rights and freedoms the populace 
receive are taken for granted and not appreciated. Imper­
fections within the Armed Forces abound, but it is still 
their responsibility to act as a defender of America's 
principles, a deterrent to aggressive acts against the U.S., 
and an implement to assist in the execution of national 
poli c y .
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In free states ... no man should take up 
arms, but with a view to defend his country and 
its laws! He puts not off the citizen when he 
enters the camp; Because it is because he is a 
citizen, and would wish to cont inue« s o , that he 
makes himself for awhile a soldier.
The American public must be constantly reminded that the
freedoms they possess and value do not come without effort.
A democracy must continue to be strong and to do so it needs
the support of its citizens— not only financially but
physically— in maintaining the freedom and prestige of the
nat i o n .
3. Summa ry
Public opinion towards military service has always been 
a crucial element influencing a nation's level of national 
security. In a democratic society, it is even more 
important, for military service is not representative of the 
freedoms enjoyed by non-military members of the society.
The influence that economic factors, unemployment, wages, 
and occupational prestige has on the attitude of the public 
towards military service is easily understood and researched 
External events or crisis influence on public opinion 
concerning military service is much less evident and 
extremely difficult to measure. Throughout the course of 
this research, no supporting evidence was uncovered which 
would indicate that external crises have a significant 
impact on public opinion and military service.
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America's All Volunteer Force is more reliant today 
upon public support than the conscriptive forces ever were. 
Current attitudes toward military service are vitally 
important in the attraction and retention of qualified 
quality soldiers. American y o u t h , however, have never been 
overly receptive to military service, even though it is an 
individual obligation to the community. The precept that 
membership in the community implies a willingness to defend 
it is the link between the rights of an individual and his 
obligation to the nation and has always been a strong point
p /of a democracy. Today's youth, however, are more concerned
with individual success and tend to neglect the fact that 
prosperity for the community means prosperity for its 
memb e r s .
The polls and surveys uncovered during this research 
have been limited. What results are available show a low 
desire among Americans for military service. A 1977 Gallup 
Poll reflected that two out of every three Americans favored 
a law requiring all young men to devote a year to national 
service, either military or n o n —mi 1 itary. But when the draft 
age population responses were isolated only 47 percent of 
those between 18 and 24 years old supported national
OKservice. This is not an entirely new attitude. Military
service, as stated earlier, has never been popular with 
Americans. Estimates of propensities to enlist among non-
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prior service males have ranged from 18 percent in the early 
1970s to 33 percent in 1977.^^
Perhaps even more important is the absence of a 
continuing polling agency which monitors attitudes and 
opinions on military service. The Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations (CCFR) has conducted a series of polls over 
the past thirty-eight years asking many questions concerning 
national security issues. None of the polls located asked 
any questions concerning military service. This lack of 
opinion analysis, not only by CCFR but also by Harris and 
Gallup, provides evidence that the issue of military service 
is not a public concern until it affects them directly— as 
demonstrated by the Gallup Poll of draft age individuals 
mentioned earlier.
The American public seems willing to trade high-tech 
weapons— resulting in increased defense spending— for 
manpower with which to defend the nation and project its 
policies worldwide. Until society comes to regard military 
service as a respectable occupation and necessary for the 
nation's well being, the All Volunteer Force will have 
difficulties attracting the numbers and quality needed to 
man a modern force capable of deterring aggression.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION
Traditional American approaches to the role of the 
United States in world affairs has been, primarily, one of 
leadership by example rather than cooperation in inter­
national projects. During the last forty years, however, 
a realization has emerged among Americans that while ideals 
and examples are important, they are not enough in a world 
where actions of all nations are interrelated.
Until the realization of this international attachment 
emerged, American policies for raising, developing, and 
employing military forces were generally established under 
the American civil-m i1 i t a ry tradition. This tradition called 
for small volunteer military forces which could be augmented 
in time of need by citizen soldiers recruited from state 
militias or— as in the twentieth century— through a system 
of conscription. Additionally, Americans, except in times 
of crisis, have looked upon the military as a national 
institution which was necessary but evil. Those who abide 
by these thoughts tend to argue that the American civil- 
military relationship should be one in which all decisions, 
except the most militarily and technically specific, should 
be accomplished by civilians and that military spending is 
a waste of funds which could be more productively used 61 se — 
where.
105
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Since World War II, this relationship has changed 
substantially. Increased need for military power in 
executing America's expanded role in the world order has 
projected the military establishment into the center ring 
of public scrutiny and concern. The need for increased 
funds and manpower has made the military more of a factor 
not only in foreign policy but also in domestic policy. 
Charles W. K e g I e y , Jr. and Patrick J. McGowan sum up the 
relationship between domestic and foreign policy best:
Domestic politics shape the foreign policy 
options that are open to society; effect the 
levels of resources available for external use; 
and influence greatly states' ability to cope ^
effectively with external threats to core values.
The increased importance of the military in the normal
conduct of national affairs has also placed military planners
in a more prestigious position in contributing to foreign
policy development. Because of the dangers and external
threats in the rapidly changing world around them, Americans
have allowed the military establishment to grow and become
an effective and powerful instrument of foreign policy.
Just how effective and powerful the military will be
is determined by the resources allocated to it by the nation.
Few Americans today doubt the need for an effective military
force to implement national security policies, but many ask
the question "how much is enough?" The level to which
Americans will go to support increased allotment of the
nation's resources to the military is dependent on both the
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domestic and external world environment. The primacy of 
domestic affairs has not changed, but there are times when 
the concerns of America are focused on external events. This 
concentration of attention on external events Is most 
apparent when that event is seen as a threat to the normal 
conduct of the nation's affairs. The concern is escalated 
when there is a threat of violence present, which is a 
characteristic— directly or indirectly— of most of the 
confrontations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Examples include the Berlin Crisis, the Hungarian 
Revolution, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the various and 
continuing Mid-East Conflict, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, and the unrest in Third World nations. It is 
at times like these when the public influence on policy is 
greatest and most visible. After all, it is the public who 
must sacrifice the two most important resources a nation 
h a s — manpower and money. Their willingness to do this may 
indicate the level of support they have for the military 
or the perceived need for a strong military in answer to 
w o r 1d event s .
The percentage of the federal budget allocated to 
defense seems to be a reliable indication of the importance 
placed on foreign affairs. As a result of this emphasis, 
the status of the nation's armed forces is also affected, 
for as Samuel Huntington states: "A nation can achieve
little by diplomacy unless it has the strength and the will
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to back up its demands with f o r c e . I t  is here, in the area 
of budgetary distributions of the nation's wealth, that 
public opinion can exercise the three functions addressed 
in Chapter Two. Those three functions being that opinion 
can constrain policy, stimulate policy, and act as a resource 
for policy makers. Public approval for increased defense 
spending may stimulate policy makers to become more adventure­
some in foreign policy programs while a consensus favoring 
less spending would affect the elected official's thoughts 
on foreign policy development. Public opinion may also be 
a resource upon which elected officials or policy makers 
might call in putting pressure on the President for either 
an increase or decrease in defense spending. In Table 1 and 
Figure 1, increases in public support for defense spending 
are evident during and after years in which an international 
crisis occurred involving the U.S. When there is a drop in 
those polled who desire more defense spending, a further 
analysis of attitudes surveyed show that international 
affairs are seen as non-threatening. This was evident in 
surveys taken after Vietnam, the end of the "Cold War," and 
the birth of detente. Later in the seventies, the increase 
in concern toward the accelerated Soviet military buildup 
and the occurrence of the 1976 Mid-East war, forced Americans 
again to see the need for rebuilding their military forces 
to give them the strength to once again become a dominant 
force in wo rid affairs.
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Americans have demonstrated their support for the 
nation's policy and military by favoring increased defense 
spending and the indication that foreign policy concerns 
are becoming more important to their domestic well being.
One resource U.S. citizens do not seem as willing to provide 
for national security and the reinforcement of the nation's 
policies is manpower. The willingness to provide funds for 
n e w  weapons and programs is seen as the furthest limit 
Americans are willing to go in an attempt to bolster 
America's position in the international arena. Since the 
end of the draft in 1972, the All Volunteer Army has attained 
its recruiting goals only three times. Only one of these 
years, 1980 (after the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan), could be attributed in part to an 
increase in fervor to defend America's prestige and ideals. 
Primary motivators for individuals enlisting in the Army is, 
as mentioned in Chapter Four, due to the domestic environ­
ment. During Winter Quarter 1983 at the University of 
Montana, a survey was taken by Dr. Thomas Payne concerning 
student attitudes toward military budget decisions, including 
personnel and weapons. The students, mostly sophomores 
studying American Government, (6) reflected what 1 believe 
is, and has been, a consistent attitude among Americans 
concerning the support of national security policies. Of 
the 51 students surveyed, a total of 96 percent thought
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either the Volunteer Army should be expanded (15) or m a i n ­
tained at present strength levels (34). Less than 21 
percent of these same students were in favor of universal 
service for all 18-21 year olds for one year. Seventy-eight 
percent of the students did agree with universal service if 
there was a major war, and 54 percent thought the selective
oservice registration should continue. This data is perhaps 
not scientifically valid, but 1 believe it demonstrates the 
attitude of Americans toward military service. Americans 
want the protection and security of a strong military during 
peacetime but are not willing to interrupt their individual 
pursuits by serving in the armed forces. During an inter­
national crisis affecting American interests, Americans will 
rise like the fabled Minute Man of Lexington Green to defend 
the ideals and principles of America. In today's world of 
fast changing situations and high technology warfare, being 
ready in a minute may not be soon enough. I do not profess 
to believe that all Americans should be professional 
soldiers. But we must bring back the sense of duty— not 
blind obedience— to our country that has been replaced by 
a sense of duty only to ourselves, complemented by a lack 
of concern over protecting the source of our freedoms.
Today there is no overt opposition to service in the 
armed forces, but there is also no visible support. When 
the domestic market place returns to normal and the unemploy-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Ill
ment rate decreases, the services will again experience 
difficulties in attaining their recruiting goals. Fewer and 
fewer Americans will experience military service and have 
an opinion— based on actual participation— on the necessity 
and benefit of military service. In turn, America's armed 
forces may become less and less of a deterrent in the 
foreign policy arena, and the realization of Demosthenes 
admonition to the Athenians may be applied to America as 
wel 1 :
There is one source, O Athenians [Americans] 
to all your defeats. It is that your citizens 
have ceased to be soldiers.
1. Summary
In conclusion, public opinion must be a consideration 
in the development of a democratic nation's foreign and 
domestic policies. It is extremely important in constrain­
ing policy, stimulating policy, and providing a resource for 
policy makers to use in policy development. Public opinion 
is vitally important in supporting the allocation of 
resources towards a nation's military, especially the 
resources of money and manpower. Fluctuations in support 
of defense spending may be traced to the occurrence of 
external crisis and be a valid indication of public support 
or opposition to the military establishment. Manpower 
fluctuations— under a volunteer system— will be caused more 
often, not by external events but by changes in the domestic
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environment.
American civil-mi 1 i t a ry relations are an area public 
opinion will often focus on because of the visibility of the 
military establishment. The military does not need to be 
"liked" or supported by everyone. Its mission, however, in 
respect to the nation's survival must be considered and 
respected by America's citizens; for without a strong and 
efficient military, the nation is neither influential or 
safe in the international environment.
Any kind of war short of jihad (a holy war), 
is and will be unpopular with the people. Because 
such wars are fought with legions, and Americans, 
even when they are proud of them, do not like 
their legions. They do not like to serve in them 
or even allow them to be what they must.
For legions have no ideological or spiritual 
home in the liberal society. The liberal society 
has no use for 1 eg i ons--a s its prophets have long 
p r o c l a i m e d .
Except that in this world there are Tigers.^
T. R. Fehrenbach 
The American people's attitude towards, and acceptance 
of, the military must be based on the realized need for a 
force to protect their rights, values, and freedoms. As 
Fehrenbach says "... in this world there are Tigers," and 
Americans must be prepared to fend off "Tiger" attacks 
which attempt to deprive Americans of their freedom.
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CHAPTER FIVE ENDNOTES
Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Patrick J. McGowan, eds., 
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(Boulder, C o l o r a d o : Westview Press, Ï979), p. 32.
3Thomas Paine, Unpublished Survey, Military Budget 
Decision, (University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, 1983).
^ T . R. Fehrenbach, as cited in William Hauser, Ame r i ca * : 
Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Milltary Relations (Balt i-
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